财务舞弊公司监事会后续治理及其对外部审计影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-11-15 17:23

【摘要】：财务舞弊一直是实务界和学术界关注的话题。学者们普遍认同财务舞弊公司治理机制存在缺陷，但大多数学者都是从股权特征或是董事会治理的角度对财务舞弊进行了研究，而对于负有内部监督、制衡责任的监事会的相关研究则简陋很多。这种情况在我国也很常见，但我国企业内部监督职能被一分为二——分为监事会机制和独立董事机制。虽然独立董事机制治理效用也不容乐观，但是其从属于地位举足轻重的董事会，这就得到了众多研究公司内部监督机制的学者们的青睐；相较于此，监事会权力薄弱，治理效用较低，“形同虚设”的地位使其遭受学者们的长期忽视。这种回避的现象并不能说明我国企业的监事会机制已趋于完善，恰恰相反，这种机制需要被深入剖析，需要得到更实质的改善。监事会机制起源于德国，后来也被日本采用，，其实际的监督效用均高于我国的水平，这不得不引起我们的深思。另外，学者们总是不乏对于财务舞弊的成因分析，却忽略了财务舞弊后的治理情况，这对于发生了财务舞弊行为的企业也缺少指导意义。鉴于此，本文从监事会后续治理的角度切入，研究财务舞弊和外部审计，并进一步探讨公司内外两种监督机制间是否存在监督职能互补的关系。本文在文献回顾和现状分析的基础上，参考相关理论，提出了假设，构建了模型。本文选取2004-2008年被公开谴责的违规事件，研究区间为公告前一年至公告后第三年，报表涵盖区间为2003-2011年。使用Excel2003筛选出沪深两市符合条件的48家财务舞弊公司及与之对应的48个控制样本。然后运用Stata11.0对样本进行配对样本T检验和Logistic回归，研究公告前一年至公告后第三年监事会后续治理情况及其对外部审计的影响。主要研究结论如下：第一，财务舞弊发生后，监事会的规模略有下降，持股比例极低，职工代表比例基本维持在法定水平上，独立性有限，会议频度提高，人员有小规模变更。总体来说，监事会的后续治理虽然不能称之为高效，但至少在某些方面采取了一定的措施来提高自身的监督职能。同时，外部审计的变更比率较低，有可能存在合谋行为。第二，财务舞弊发生后，审计师变更比率与监事会会议频度显著正相关。第三，财务舞弊可能是激发监事会监督效用的关键因素，财务舞弊发生后，公司内外两种监督机制间更有可能存在一定程度上的监督职能互补关系。最后，结合本文的理论研究和实证分析结果，提出了进一步完善后续治理中的监事会结构、进一步规范后续治理中的监事会行为、进一步提高舞弊前的监事会治理效率以及明确外部审计师责任、进一步规范审计市场的政策建议。
[Abstract]:Financial fraud has always been a topic of concern in the field of practice and academia. Scholars generally agree that there are defects in the corporate governance mechanism of financial fraud, but most scholars have studied financial fraud from the perspective of equity characteristics or board governance, and have internal supervision. The relevant research on the board of supervisors with checks and balances is much simpler. This kind of situation is also very common in our country, but the internal supervision function of our country's enterprise is divided into two parts: the mechanism of board of supervisors and the mechanism of independent director. Although the governance utility of the independent director mechanism is not optimistic, it is subordinate to the board of directors, which is favored by many scholars who study the internal supervision mechanism of the company. Compared with this, the board of supervisors is weak in power and low in effectiveness of governance, and the status of "virtual" causes it to be neglected by scholars for a long time. This phenomenon of avoidance does not show that the mechanism of the board of supervisors of Chinese enterprises has been improved. On the contrary, the mechanism needs to be deeply analyzed and to be improved more substantially. The mechanism of board of supervisors originated in Germany and was adopted by Japan later. Its actual effectiveness of supervision is higher than that of our country, which has to arouse our deep thinking. In addition, scholars always analyze the causes of financial fraud, but ignore the governance after financial fraud, which is also lack of guidance for enterprises that have financial fraud. In view of this, this paper studies financial fraud and external audit from the perspective of the board of supervisors' subsequent governance, and further discusses whether there is a complementary relationship between the two supervision mechanisms inside and outside the company. On the basis of literature review and current situation analysis, this paper puts forward the hypothesis and constructs the model with reference to relevant theories. This paper selects the violations that were publicly condemned from 2004 to 2008. The research interval is from the year before the announcement to the third year after the announcement. The report covers the period of 2003-2011. Excel2003 was used to screen 48 financial fraud companies and 48 control samples. Then we use Stata11.0 to carry out paired sample T test and Logistic regression to study the follow-up governance of the board of supervisors from the year before the announcement to the third year after the announcement and its impact on the external audit. The main conclusions are as follows: first, after the financial fraud, the scale of the board of supervisors decreased slightly, the proportion of shareholding is very low, the proportion of staff representatives is basically maintained in the legal level, the independence is limited, the frequency of meetings is increased, and the staff has small scale changes. Generally speaking, the follow-up governance of the board of supervisors can not be called high efficiency, but at least some measures have been taken to improve its supervisory function in some aspects. At the same time, the change rate of external audit is low, there may be collusion behavior. Secondly, after financial fraud, the auditor change rate is positively correlated with the frequency of supervisors' meeting. Third, financial fraud may be the key factor to stimulate the supervisory effectiveness of the board of supervisors. After the occurrence of financial fraud, it is more likely that there is a certain degree of complementary relationship between the two supervision mechanisms inside and outside the company. Finally, combined with the theoretical research and empirical analysis results of this paper, proposed to further improve the structure of the Board of Supervisors in the follow-up governance, and further standardize the behavior of the Board of Supervisors in the follow-up governance. Further improve the efficiency of the board of supervisors before fraud and clarify the responsibilities of external auditors, further standardize the audit market policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F239.4;F272.91

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