中国B股市场双重审计研究
发布时间：2018-11-18 10:57
【摘要】： 2007年9月12号证监会发文取消了B股市场双重审计的强制性,从1996年B股双重审计开始执行到今年的取消已经有十一年的时间,因此:(1)双重审计不仅存在单一审计存在的问题,而且还存在双重审计的特有问题值得深入研究,这些问题可能直接关系到双重审计未来发展;(2)有必要对双重审计模式的发展做一些回顾与总结。基于以上两点,本文将主要探讨双重审计下的审计师与被审计单位、审计师与审计师之间形成的多重关系,以及这种关系对与上市公司高质量的审计需求和对审计师选择的影响。 本文以2004、2005和2006年三年同时发行A、B股上市公司及其A、B股审计师为研究样本,考察了上市公司境外投资者持股、境外董事,A股审计师选聘等因素对B股审计师选聘影响,以及A、B股高质量审计师对总审计费用的影响。在控制了公司规模、财务杠杆、盈利能力、审计风险、审计意见以及其他因素以后,发现:首先,境外投资者的持股与B股高质量审计师之间呈倒U形结构;其次,董事会中外籍董事比例很低,对高质量B股审计需求不明显;上市公司在选择了A股高质量审计师后,表现出对B股高质量审计师需求明显不足,同时,在向A股审计师支付了高额审计费用后,也不倾向再为B股审计师支付高额审计费用;在B股审计市场上,高质量的审计师更倾向于以审计集团的形式来获得同一家上市公司的A、B股年报审计项目;最后检验发现了A、B股高质量的审计师会导致上市公司总的审计费用的增加。 本文共分五章:第一章为绪论部分;第二章主要分析了B股市场双重审计的政策革沿、B股市场双重审计的市场现状等,同时分析了A股补充审计的政策沿革,并对B股市场双重审计和A股的补充审计做了对比分析,对双重审计下审计关系异化和审计集团现象做了论述,还对B股双重审计强制性取消的时机做了简单分析,进一步对强制性取消后对我国证券审计市场的影响做了说明;第三章首先实证检验了B股市场双重审计下的审计需求和审计师选择情况,以及高质量审计师与审计集团的关系;第四章对高质量审计师和总审计费用的关系做了实证检验;第五章总结了研究的主要结论,提出了一些关于双重审计模式发展政策建议,并对双重审计的未来研究方向做了一些理论预期。
[Abstract]:On September 12, 2007, the Securities Regulatory Commission issued a letter canceling the mandatory double audit of the B-share market. It has been 11 years since the implementation of the double audit of B-share in 1996 to the cancellation of this year. Therefore: (1) there are not only the problems of single audit, but also the unique problems of dual audit, which may be directly related to the future development of dual audit; (2) it is necessary to review and summarize the development of dual audit mode. Based on the above two points, this paper will mainly discuss the multiple relationships between auditors and audited units, auditors and auditors under dual audit. And the impact of this relationship on the high-quality audit demand and auditor selection of listed companies. In this paper, based on the sample of A, B shares listed companies and their auditors of A and B shares issued simultaneously in 2005 and 2006, this paper investigates the influence of foreign investors' shareholding, overseas directors and A share auditors on the selection and appointment of B shares auditors. And A, B shares of high-quality auditors on the overall audit costs. After controlling the company size, financial leverage, profitability, audit risk, audit opinion, and other factors, it is found that: first, there is an inverted U-shaped structure between foreign investors' holdings and high-quality B shares auditors; Secondly, the proportion of foreign directors in the board of directors is very low, and the demand for high quality B shares audit is not obvious. After selecting the high-quality auditors of A-shares, the listed companies show that the demand for high-quality auditors of B-shares is obviously insufficient. At the same time, after paying high audit fees to the auditors of A-shares, Nor do they tend to pay high audit fees for B shares auditors; In the B share audit market, high quality auditors tend to obtain the A-, B-share annual report audit items of the same listed company in the form of audit group. Finally, it is found that high quality auditors of A and B shares lead to the increase of total audit cost of listed companies. This paper is divided into five chapters: the first chapter is the introduction part; The second chapter mainly analyzes the policy development of double auditing in B share market, the market status quo of double audit in B share market, and the policy evolution of A share supplementary audit. It also makes a comparative analysis of double audit of B share market and supplementary audit of A share, discusses the alienation of audit relationship and the phenomenon of audit group under double audit, and makes a brief analysis on the opportunity of mandatory cancellation of double audit of B share. Further explained the impact of mandatory cancellation on China's securities audit market; The third chapter empirically tests the audit demand and auditor selection under the double audit of B share market and the relationship between the high quality auditor and the audit group, the fourth chapter makes an empirical test on the relationship between the high quality auditor and the total audit cost. The fifth chapter summarizes the main conclusions of the study, puts forward some policy recommendations on the development of dual audit mode, and makes some theoretical expectations on the future research direction of dual audit.
【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F832.51;F239.4;F224
本文编号：2339840
[Abstract]:On September 12, 2007, the Securities Regulatory Commission issued a letter canceling the mandatory double audit of the B-share market. It has been 11 years since the implementation of the double audit of B-share in 1996 to the cancellation of this year. Therefore: (1) there are not only the problems of single audit, but also the unique problems of dual audit, which may be directly related to the future development of dual audit; (2) it is necessary to review and summarize the development of dual audit mode. Based on the above two points, this paper will mainly discuss the multiple relationships between auditors and audited units, auditors and auditors under dual audit. And the impact of this relationship on the high-quality audit demand and auditor selection of listed companies. In this paper, based on the sample of A, B shares listed companies and their auditors of A and B shares issued simultaneously in 2005 and 2006, this paper investigates the influence of foreign investors' shareholding, overseas directors and A share auditors on the selection and appointment of B shares auditors. And A, B shares of high-quality auditors on the overall audit costs. After controlling the company size, financial leverage, profitability, audit risk, audit opinion, and other factors, it is found that: first, there is an inverted U-shaped structure between foreign investors' holdings and high-quality B shares auditors; Secondly, the proportion of foreign directors in the board of directors is very low, and the demand for high quality B shares audit is not obvious. After selecting the high-quality auditors of A-shares, the listed companies show that the demand for high-quality auditors of B-shares is obviously insufficient. At the same time, after paying high audit fees to the auditors of A-shares, Nor do they tend to pay high audit fees for B shares auditors; In the B share audit market, high quality auditors tend to obtain the A-, B-share annual report audit items of the same listed company in the form of audit group. Finally, it is found that high quality auditors of A and B shares lead to the increase of total audit cost of listed companies. This paper is divided into five chapters: the first chapter is the introduction part; The second chapter mainly analyzes the policy development of double auditing in B share market, the market status quo of double audit in B share market, and the policy evolution of A share supplementary audit. It also makes a comparative analysis of double audit of B share market and supplementary audit of A share, discusses the alienation of audit relationship and the phenomenon of audit group under double audit, and makes a brief analysis on the opportunity of mandatory cancellation of double audit of B share. Further explained the impact of mandatory cancellation on China's securities audit market; The third chapter empirically tests the audit demand and auditor selection under the double audit of B share market and the relationship between the high quality auditor and the audit group, the fourth chapter makes an empirical test on the relationship between the high quality auditor and the total audit cost. The fifth chapter summarizes the main conclusions of the study, puts forward some policy recommendations on the development of dual audit mode, and makes some theoretical expectations on the future research direction of dual audit.
【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F832.51;F239.4;F224
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