政府绩效审计的经济学分析

发布时间：2018-12-07 12:45

【摘要】： 随着我国社会主义市场经济的发展,民主政治制度的不断完善,公众对政府的要求越来越高,对政府在某些工作方面的不足质疑声此起彼伏。国家审计署已连续多年掀起“审计风暴”,审计成为公众了解和监督政府的一个窗口。政府也越来越意识到了审计的重要性,审计也成为政府改进自身建设的一个手段。国务院对审计署查出的问题,责成相关部门整改,提高了政府工作效率,同时也赢得了公众信任。如何更好的发挥审计的作用,如何更好的使审计充当起公众和政府彼此信任的桥梁,进一步作好政府绩效审计工作成为亟待解决的课题。本文依据委托代理理论、博弈论的方法,对委托人和代理人之间关系,运用博弈理论进行了分析,坚持理论联系实际、实证分析和规范分析相统一的研究方法,立足于我国政府审计工作实际,借鉴国外的先进经验,尽可能用全新的视角审视和研究我国现阶段行政府绩效审计的理论和实践问题。本文第一章在简单介绍研究背景基础上,明确本文所要研究的问题,并对相关概念、研究思路、研究方法、本文的创新点和不足进行简要说明。第二章阐述政府绩效审计的一般问题,对概念内涵、与违规审计的区别、当前目标以及政府绩效审计涉及的主体进行了论述。第三章着重阐述了西方及我国政府绩效审计的发展过程。第四章分析政府绩效审计中的委托代理关系,详细论述委托代理理论概念同时,重点分析了委托代理关系是政府绩效审计产生发展的根源、政府绩效审计中委托代理关系的层次分析以及政府绩效审计归属关系。第五章对博弈分析在政府绩效审计中的作用进行了阐述,利用博弈理论对不同主体的博弈过程的分析。第六章通过用委托代理理论及博弈理论对政府绩效审计的分析,得出促进政府绩效审计健康发展必须推进公开、透明机制的建立。第七章利用上面的理论分引出讨论确保绩效审计的评价标准问题。第八章对政府绩效审计发展进行展望,提出积极推进公开透明机制的运行和增强审计独立性的建议。创新点和不足。本文对政府绩效审计涉及的各方主体关系,应用委托代理理论进行的详尽的分析论述,这是以往文献中没有过的:应用博弈论的观点,对委托代理关系中不同博弈主体的博弈过程进行分析,从独特的视角阐述了政府绩效审计的必然;对审计标准做了深入系统的探讨。但是,在例证某些事项时,有时并不十分充分:审计标准模式的建立也是比较粗浅的
[Abstract]:With the development of the socialist market economy and the continuous improvement of the democratic political system, the public demands the government more and more, and the lack of the government in some aspects has been questioned one after another. The National Audit Office has set off a "auditing storm" for many years, and audit has become a window for the public to understand and supervise the government. The government is becoming more and more aware of the importance of auditing, which has become a means for the government to improve its own construction. The State Council has ordered the relevant departments to rectify the problems identified by the Audit Office, thus improving the efficiency of the government and winning public trust. How to better play the role of audit, how to better make the audit as a bridge of trust between the public and the government, further better government performance audit work has become an urgent task to be solved. Based on the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper analyzes the relationship between the principal and the agent by using the game theory, insists on the unified research method of integrating theory with practice, empirical analysis and normative analysis. Based on the practice of government audit in our country and drawing on the advanced experience of foreign countries, this paper tries to examine and study the theory and practice of government performance audit in our country from a new angle of view as far as possible. In the first chapter, on the basis of a brief introduction of the research background, the problems to be studied in this paper are clarified, and the related concepts, research ideas, research methods, innovations and shortcomings of this paper are briefly explained. The second chapter expounds the general problems of the government performance audit, discusses the connotation of the concept, the difference between the government performance audit and the illegal audit, the current goal and the main body involved in the government performance audit. The third chapter focuses on the development process of government performance audit in western and China. The fourth chapter analyzes the principal-agent relationship in government performance audit, and discusses the concept of principal-agent theory in detail. At the same time, it analyzes the principal-agent relationship is the root of the development of government performance audit. The hierarchical analysis of principal-agent relationship in government performance audit and the ownership relationship of government performance audit. The fifth chapter expounds the role of game analysis in government performance audit and analyzes the game process of different subjects by using game theory. The sixth chapter analyzes the government performance audit by using the principal-agent theory and the game theory, and draws the conclusion that to promote the healthy development of the government performance audit, we must promote the establishment of open and transparent mechanism. The seventh chapter discusses the evaluation standard of performance audit by using the above theory. The eighth chapter looks forward to the development of government performance audit, and puts forward some suggestions to promote the operation of open and transparent mechanism and enhance the independence of audit. Innovation points and shortcomings. In this paper, the relationship between the parties involved in the government performance audit, the application of principal-agent theory to the detailed analysis and discussion, this is not in previous literature: apply the point of view of game theory, This paper analyzes the game process of different game players in the principal-agent relationship, and expounds the necessity of government performance audit from a unique angle of view. The audit standard is discussed systematically. However, when illustrating certain matters, it is sometimes not quite sufficient: the establishment of the auditing standard model is also relatively superficial.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F239.44

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