审计具有保险功能吗——基于政府官员变更的自然实验
发布时间：2018-12-15 15:28
【摘要】：本文选择2003—2013年沪深两市A股非金融类上市公司作为样本,以具有外生冲击特性的市级政府官员变更作为切入点,研究政治不确定性对公司收到审计意见概率的影响及其作用机理,以验证我国审计是否具有保险功能。研究结果表明,从总体上看,政府官员变更将会提高审计师对其辖区内公司出具非标审计意见的概率,但按照产权性质分组检验后,该结果仅在市属国有企业样本中显著。进一步检验发现,市级政府官员变更使得企业风险水平上升,同样,该结果也仅在市属国有企业样本中显著。以上结果表明,审计师会因外部政治不确定性增加带来的企业未来风险增加,而提高出具非标意见概率。这支持了审计保险假说,检验了中国资本市场相关审计诉讼法律制度的政策效应。
[Abstract]:This paper chooses Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies as samples from 2003 to 2013, and takes the change of municipal government officials with exogenous impact characteristics as the starting point. This paper studies the influence of political uncertainty on the probability of receiving audit opinions and its mechanism to verify whether the audit of our country has the function of insurance. The results show that, on the whole, the change of government officials will increase the probability of auditors issuing non-standard audit opinions on the companies in their jurisdiction, but the results are only significant in the sample of municipal state-owned enterprises after grouping according to the nature of property rights. Further tests show that the change of government officials at the municipal level increases the risk level of enterprises, and the results are also significant in the sample of municipal state-owned enterprises. The above results show that auditors will increase the probability of issuing non-standard opinions because of the increase of external political uncertainty. This supports the audit insurance hypothesis and tests the policy effect of the relevant audit litigation legal system in China's capital market.
【作者单位】： 暨南大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71372167、71602069)资助
【分类号】：F239.4
本文编号：2380879
[Abstract]:This paper chooses Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies as samples from 2003 to 2013, and takes the change of municipal government officials with exogenous impact characteristics as the starting point. This paper studies the influence of political uncertainty on the probability of receiving audit opinions and its mechanism to verify whether the audit of our country has the function of insurance. The results show that, on the whole, the change of government officials will increase the probability of auditors issuing non-standard audit opinions on the companies in their jurisdiction, but the results are only significant in the sample of municipal state-owned enterprises after grouping according to the nature of property rights. Further tests show that the change of government officials at the municipal level increases the risk level of enterprises, and the results are also significant in the sample of municipal state-owned enterprises. The above results show that auditors will increase the probability of issuing non-standard opinions because of the increase of external political uncertainty. This supports the audit insurance hypothesis and tests the policy effect of the relevant audit litigation legal system in China's capital market.
【作者单位】： 暨南大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71372167、71602069)资助
【分类号】：F239.4
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，本文编号：2380879
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