议价能力对审计定价的影响——基于双边随机边界模型的分析
发布时间:2019-01-05 11:31
【摘要】:审计收费中的最终价格确定是审计双方博弈的结果。使用双边随机边界模型分析框架分析审计收费中的定价,以及审计双方议价能力对审计定价的影响。结果发现:事务所的议价能力使得审计收费比理论均衡价格高出大约24.02%,上市公司的议价能力使得审计收费比理论均衡价格低了大约17.29%,两者的最终博弈结果使得中国审计收费比均衡价格高大约6.73%,中国事务所审计收费存在一定的高收费现象,事务所对大规模企业有收费溢价,2006年后,国际四大事务所存在高收费溢价现象。
[Abstract]:The final price determination in audit fees is the result of game between audit parties. The bilateral stochastic boundary model is used to analyze the pricing of audit fees and the influence of the bargaining power of audit parties on audit pricing. The results show that the bargaining power of the firm makes the audit fee higher than the theoretical equilibrium price by about 24.022.The bargaining power of the listed company makes the audit fee about 17.29 lower than the theoretical equilibrium price. As a result of the final game, the audit fees in China are about 6.73 higher than the equilibrium price. The audit fees of Chinese firms have a certain phenomenon of high fees, and the firms have a premium to large scale enterprises. After 2006, The international big four firm exists the phenomenon of high charge premium.
【作者单位】: 桂林理工大学管理学院;西南交通大学经济管理学院;
【分类号】:F224;F239.4
[Abstract]:The final price determination in audit fees is the result of game between audit parties. The bilateral stochastic boundary model is used to analyze the pricing of audit fees and the influence of the bargaining power of audit parties on audit pricing. The results show that the bargaining power of the firm makes the audit fee higher than the theoretical equilibrium price by about 24.022.The bargaining power of the listed company makes the audit fee about 17.29 lower than the theoretical equilibrium price. As a result of the final game, the audit fees in China are about 6.73 higher than the equilibrium price. The audit fees of Chinese firms have a certain phenomenon of high fees, and the firms have a premium to large scale enterprises. After 2006, The international big four firm exists the phenomenon of high charge premium.
【作者单位】: 桂林理工大学管理学院;西南交通大学经济管理学院;
【分类号】:F224;F239.4
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