注册会计师审计行为异化的博弈论分析

发布时间：2019-03-04 14:47

【摘要】： 近年来,随着我国资本市场的不断发展和国有企业改革的进一步深化对注册会计师委以重任.加上我国加入了WTO以后更为其提供了广阔的业务空间。众所周知注册会计师在市场经济发展中有着举足轻重的作用,尤其在对财务信息真实度要求较高的证券市场中它更是起着市场灵魂的作用。可以想象一个连会计信息都失真了的证券市场何以能长期取得投资者的信任?又凭什么能具有良好的发展前景?然而,近年来“银广厦”、“琼民源”、“红光实业”、“东方锅炉”等上市公司的会计造假事件引发出“中天勤”、“海南大正”、“蜀都”、“四川君合”等会计师事务所受罚甚至吊销执照。在这些案件中,注册会计师不仅没有尽到为投资者把关的作用,有的甚至扮演了很不光彩的角色。规范注册会计师行业已经刻不容缓,然而面对存在的问题,人们多是从道德、职业操守和“良心”的角度去要求注册会计师,没有从更深层次的经济学角度去思考问题。事实上,注册会计师也是市场经济中谋求利益的经济人,他们在执业过程中,受到来自利益和道德的两难选择,甚至陷入了博弈论所描述的“囚徒困境”之中,这是导致注册会计师审计行为异化的最主要的原因。因此,本文试图从经济学的角度出发,通过分析审计的独立性,注册会计师与上市公司以及注册会计师与监管部门的博弈关系来说明导致注册会计师审计行为异化的原因并提出解决的办法。第一部分主要是介绍了审计市场各方的利益关系以及利用博弈论的观点分析其关系的可能性。第二部分是对注册会计师独立审计的博弈论分析。第三部分分析了注册会计师与被审计单位合谋的博弈论分析第四部分针对以上的博弈论结论提出相应的解决办法及合理化建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the continuous development of China's capital market and the further deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, CPA is entrusted with an important task. In addition, after China's accession to the WTO, it has provided a broad business space. It is well known that certified public accountants play an important role in the development of market economy, especially in the securities market, which requires a high degree of authenticity of financial information, which plays a role as the soul of the market. You can imagine how a securities market with distorted accounting information can win the trust of investors in the long run. And how can there be a good prospect of development? However, in recent years, "Yinguang House", "Qiong Minyuan", "Hongguang Industry", "Oriental Boiler" and other accounting forgery incidents of listed companies have triggered "Zhongtian", "Hainan Dazheng" and "Shu du". Accounting firms such as Sichuan Junhe were fined and even revoked their licences. In these cases, CPA not only failed to act as a gatekeeper for investors, but also played a very disgraceful role. It is urgent to standardize the CPA profession. However, in the face of the existing problems, people mostly ask the CPA from the angle of ethics, professional ethics and "conscience", but not from a deeper point of view of economics. In fact, certified public accountants are also economic men seeking interests in the market economy. In the course of their practice, they are faced with the dilemma of interests and morality, and they even fall into the "prisoner's dilemma" described in game theory. This is the main reason leading to the dissimilation of CPA audit behavior. Therefore, this paper tries to analyze the independence of audit from the point of view of economics. The game relationship between CPA and listed companies as well as between CPA and regulatory department is to explain the reasons leading to the alienation of CPA audit behavior and put forward the solutions. The first part mainly introduces the interest relationship of audit market parties and the possibility of analyzing the relationship by using the viewpoint of game theory. The second part is the game theory analysis of CPA independent audit. The third part analyzes the game theory analysis of the collusion between certified public accountants and audited units. The fourth part puts forward corresponding solutions and rationalization suggestions to the above conclusions of game theory.
【学位授予单位】：河北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F239.4

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