农村产权抵押贷款的博弈研究
发布时间:2018-01-01 05:13
本文关键词:农村产权抵押贷款的博弈研究 出处:《西北农林科技大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:我国是一个农业大国,但农业生产力低下,城镇家庭人均可支配收入已连续11年是农村家庭人均纯收入的3倍多,城乡二元差异越来越严重,大力发展农村经济,提高农民收入迫在眉睫。由于大多数农户既没有合理的抵押品,又没有合适的担保人,所以他们很难从信用社取得贷款,农户贷款难问题已成为制约农村经济发展、提高农户收入、影响农村社会稳定的关键性因素。近年来,农村产权抵押贷款被认为可以有效的解决农户贷款难、农村金融供给不足的问题,由此可见,对于我国农村产权抵押贷款过程中农户、信用社及政府三者之间关系的研究尤为迫切。 在农村产权抵押贷款的过程中,农户、信用社以及政府三个主体之间的关系既复杂又微妙,任何一个主体的策略行动都会对其他两个主体的行为选择产生影响。总体来看,三者之间的关系可以概括为两个方面:一是三个主体通过农村产权抵押贷款过程互利互惠;二是在互惠互利的同时又存在着许多矛盾,三者之间的博弈关系明显,用博弈理论研究三者间的关系具有优势。 国内外学者主要从以下三个方面来研究农村产权抵押贷款:农户与信用社之间的关系;信用社与政府的关系;农户与政府的关系。现有对于农户、信用社、政府三者之间关系的博弈研究,多采用两两之间的纳什均衡博弈分析,或采用静态分析方法而忽略了博弈各方策略的相互影响。 本文主要从以下三个方面进行研究:一、讨论了在有审查机制和没有审查机制的情况下信用社对农户贷款申请的态度。二、讨论了政府对信用社进行检查和不检查时政府和信用社对新产权抵押贷款政策采取的行动。三、建立了三方动态博弈模型,讨论了农户、政府与信用社三者之间的关系,并求得混合策略的纳什均衡。 最后,提出了以下政策建议:信用社建立对农户行之有效的审查机制,,只有信用社尽可能提高对农户资信判断的准确性,才可能将尽可能多的资金投入广大农村市场;政府要建立对信用社科学的补偿机制,即对其税收等进行减免,并建立对信用社高效的监管机制,使农户实实在在的享受到产权抵押贷款带来的收益;政府加强对农村金融市场的监管力度,对不偿还借款的农户和骗取政府财政补贴的信用社进行处罚,以期农村信贷市场的良性发展;加强涉农信贷与涉农保险的合作,营造和谐的农村借贷环境。
[Abstract]:China is a large agricultural country, but the agricultural productivity is low, the per capita disposable income of urban households has been more than three times of the per capita net income of rural households for 11 consecutive years, and the urban-rural dual difference is becoming more and more serious. It is urgent to vigorously develop rural economy and raise farmers' income. Because most farmers have neither reasonable collateral nor suitable guarantors, it is difficult for them to obtain loans from credit cooperatives. The problem of farmers' loan has become a key factor to restrict the development of rural economy, improve the income of farmers and affect the stability of rural society. In recent years, the mortgage loan of rural property rights is considered to be an effective solution to the difficulty of farmers' loans. It can be seen that the study of the relationship among the farmers, credit cooperatives and the government in the process of rural property right mortgage loan is particularly urgent. In the process of the property right mortgage loan in rural areas, the relationship among the farmers, credit cooperatives and the government is complex and delicate. The strategic actions of any one subject will have an impact on the behavior choices of the other two subjects. The relationship between the three can be summarized as two aspects: first, the three main bodies through the process of rural property rights mortgage loan mutual benefit; On the other hand, there are many contradictions in the process of mutual benefit and mutual benefit. The game relationship among the three is obvious, so it is advantageous to study the relationship between them by using the game theory. Scholars at home and abroad mainly from the following three aspects to study the rural property rights mortgage loans: the relationship between farmers and credit cooperatives; The relationship between the credit union and the government; The relationship between farmers and government. The existing game study on the relationship among farmers, credit cooperatives and government is mostly based on Nash equilibrium game analysis. Or the static analysis method is used to ignore the interaction of game strategies. This article mainly carries on the research from the following three aspects: first, has discussed in the examination mechanism and does not have the examination mechanism situation the credit union to the farmer loan application attitude. This paper discusses the actions taken by the government and the credit cooperatives on the new property right mortgage loan policy when the government checks and does not inspect the credit cooperatives. Thirdly, the three-way dynamic game model is established, and the farmers are discussed. The relationship between government and credit cooperatives, and the Nash equilibrium of mixed strategy. Finally, the following policy recommendations are put forward: credit cooperatives establish an effective review mechanism for farmers, and only credit cooperatives can improve the accuracy of credit judgment of farmers as much as possible. It is possible to put as much money as possible into the vast rural market; The government should establish a scientific compensation mechanism for credit cooperatives, that is, the tax relief, and establish an efficient regulatory mechanism for credit cooperatives, so that farmers can really enjoy the benefits of property rights mortgage loans; The government should strengthen the supervision of the rural financial market and punish the farmers who do not repay the loan and the credit cooperatives who defraud the government financial subsidies in order to develop the rural credit market. Strengthen the cooperation between agricultural credit and agricultural insurance, and create a harmonious rural lending environment.
【学位授予单位】:西北农林科技大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.43
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