代理问题、财务困境与投资——现金流敏感度

发布时间：2018-01-04 16:02

本文关键词：代理问题、财务困境与投资——现金流敏感度　出处：《审计与经济研究》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：基于融资约束理论,探讨了代理问题和财务困境对投资—现金流敏感度的影响。以2010—2014年沪深A股上市公司为样本考察了融资约束、内部现金流与企业投资支出之间的关系,检验结果表明融资约束与投资—现金流敏感度之间呈非线性复杂关系,企业投资支出与内部现金流之间表现出U型非线性关系。进一步研究发现,控股股东代理问题和管理者代理问题可以导致投资—现金流敏感度在低融资约束的情况下反而较大,财务困境可以导致投资—现金流敏感度在高融资约束的情况下反而较小。从代理问题和财务困境的角度丰富了融资约束理论对公司投资行为的分析方法,同时也为优化我国企业投资行为提供一定的理论支持。
[Abstract]:Based on the theory of financing constraints, discusses the agency problem and financial distress flow sensitivity of investment cash. The sample inspection of the financing constraints from 2010 to 2014 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of listed companies, the relationship between internal cash flow and investment expenditure, the test results show that the sensitivity between financing constraints and investment relationship is nonlinear complex cash flow, enterprise investment and internal cash flow showed U type nonlinear relationship. Further studies showed that the agency problem of agency problems of controlling shareholders and managers can lead to investment cash flow sensitivity in low financing constraints will become larger, the financial distress can lead to investment cash flow sensitivity in the high financing constraint under the condition of smaller. The analysis method of financing constraints on corporate investment behavior from the perspective of the agency problem and financial distress is rich, but also for the better It provides a certain theoretical support to the investment behavior of China's enterprises.

【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言在放松了完全信息的假定以后,Myers和Majluf从信息不对称的角度指出,外部投资者出于逆向选择动机而要求公司支付溢价的行为导致了公司受到融资约束而出现投资不足[1]。Fazzari等以此为基础提出融资约束理论,认为投资—现金流敏感度能反映公司的融资约束程度[2],但这一

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