上市公司违规类型披露对银行借款的影响研究
发布时间:2018-01-06 16:07
本文关键词:上市公司违规类型披露对银行借款的影响研究 出处:《湖南大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:本文以声誉机制和债权人监督理论为基础,结合关于违规类型的特征差异研究,构建上市公司违规类型披露对银行借款影响差异的理论框架,并使用非参数检验方法研究了我国2000-2010年间发生违法违规行为并被披露的上市公司,探索银行借款针对我国10种不同违规类型表现出的敏感性差异。 研究发现,上市公司的违规行为的确会对其银行借款产生显著负面影响,这表现为上市公司违规行为披露前的银行借款与被处罚披露后的银行借款存在显著差异。近年来,我国上市公司违法违规行为的频发性和危害性有愈演愈烈之势,由于银行借款作为上市公司融资的重要渠道,以及银行作为债权人对上市公司的监督能力和信息优势,使我们不得不关注两者之间的关系。本文根据对每一种违规类型披露前后的银行借款进行比较,发现它们的变化特点存在一定程度的区别,,分别表现在总借款增量、短期借款增量和借款利率的波动上。为了进一步验证银行借款对不同违规类型的敏感性差异,本文比较了不同违规类型披露前后的银行借款差异,并通过两两比较找出具体差异的来源,得出结论:多数违规类型均对银行借款产生影响,而虚列资产和虚假陈述两种违规行为对银行借款的影响不显著;在引起银行借款显著变化的八种违规类型中,大多数之间不存在影响程度的差异,但违规购买股票对银行总借款增量的影响程度与推迟披露和违规担保存在显著区别,违规购买股票对借款利率的影响程度与推迟披露和大股东占用上市公司资产存在显著区别。 得到相关结论后,本文分两步进行原因分析。首先,找出违规行为对银行借款的影响因素,包括处罚时滞、处罚方式、经营状况、银行监督和行业分布。在此基础上,讨论不同违规类型对银行借款影响差异的原因,并以违规购买股票、虚列资产和推迟披露三种影响区别明显的违规类型为例,进行了相关实证检验,认为它们在处罚时滞、处罚方式、经营状况及行业分布方面确实存在差异,并因此造成对银行借款的影响区别。
[Abstract]:On the basis of reputation mechanism and creditor supervision theory, this paper constructs the theoretical framework of the influence of the disclosure of illegal types of listed companies on the bank borrowing, combined with the characteristics of the differences of the types of violations. The non-parametric test method is used to study the illegal behavior and disclosure of listed companies in China from 2000 to 2010. To explore the sensitivity of bank loans to 10 different types of violations in China. The study found that the illegal behavior of listed companies does have a significant negative impact on their bank loans. This shows that there are significant differences between bank loans before disclosure and bank loans after punishment disclosure by listed companies in recent years. The frequent occurrence and harmfulness of illegal activities of listed companies in our country are becoming more and more serious, because bank borrowing is an important channel of financing for listed companies. As well as the bank as a creditor to the listed company's supervisory ability and information advantage, we have to pay attention to the relationship between the two. This paper compares the bank loans before and after the disclosure of each type of violation. It is found that there are some differences in the characteristics of their changes, which are manifested in the total loan increment. In order to further verify the sensitivity differences of bank loans to different types of violations, this paper compares the differences of bank borrowing before and after the disclosure of different types of violations. And through the comparison to find out the source of the specific differences, draw a conclusion: most of the types of violations have an impact on bank loans, but false assets and false statements of the two violations of the impact on bank borrowing is not significant; Of the eight types of violations that cause significant changes in bank borrowing, there is no difference in the degree of influence between most of them. However, there is a significant difference between the impact of illegal purchase of stocks on the total loan increment of banks and the delay of disclosure and illegal guarantee. The influence of illegal stock purchase on borrowing interest rate is significantly different from that of delayed disclosure and large shareholders' occupation of listed company's assets. After getting the relevant conclusions, this paper analyzes the reasons in two steps. First of all, find out the influence factors of the illegal behavior to the bank loan, including penalty delay, punishment way, operating condition. On the basis of this, we discuss the reasons why different types of violations affect the bank borrowing, and buy stocks illegally. Three obvious types of violations with different effects on asset listing and delayed disclosure are taken as examples. The empirical results show that there are some differences in penalty delay, punishment mode, operating status and industry distribution. And as a result, the impact on bank loans is different.
【学位授予单位】:湖南大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.51;F832.4
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