有效激励还是以权谋私:超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险——基于不同产权性质的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 23:16

本文关键词：有效激励还是以权谋私:超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险——基于不同产权性质的实证研究　出处：《财经论丛》2017年09期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：近年来中国上市公司的高管高薪引起社会的广泛关注。本文搜集了2010-2014年中国A股上市公司前三名高管的薪酬水平,考察高管的超额薪酬与股价崩盘风险的相关关系,分析不同产权性质下高管高薪的激励效果。研究发现:国有上市公司的高管超额薪酬与股价崩盘风险正相关,证明国企中高管高薪的自利性,但该现象仅在地方国企显著;民营上市公司的高管薪酬相对国企而言更具激励性,但激励效果十分有限;超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险的关系受产权性质的影响,证明不同产权性质的企业在高管激励方面存在明显差异。本文为不同产权性质上市公司的高管薪酬制度建设提供了理论依据,并同时反映了基于激励动机的股价崩盘效应。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China listed companies paid executives caused widespread concern in the community. This paper collects the 2010-2014 China A shares of Listed Companies in the top three executive pay levels, correlation between excess compensation and stock crash risk study of executives, analysis of the incentive effect of executives high salaries of different property rights. The study found: executive compensation and excess the price collapse risk of state-owned listed companies is positively related to state-owned enterprises that self paid executives, but the phenomenon only in the local state-owned enterprises significantly; private listed companies executive compensation of state-owned enterprises is relatively more incentive, but the incentive effect is very limited; the relationship between excess executive compensation and stock crash risk is affected by the nature of the property, to prove the companies of different property rights incentive has obvious differences in terms of executives. Provides for the construction of incentive mechanism of listed company's property rights is different On the basis of this, it also reflects the effect of the stock price collapse based on incentive motivation.

【作者单位】：浙江财经大学会计学院;中国人民银行慈溪市支行;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71502161);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602179)
【分类号】：F272.91;F272.92;F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言高管薪酬作为解决股东与管理层之间委托代理问题的关键,一直是学者们研究和讨论的热门话题。设计得当的激励契约可以降低股东和管理层之间的代理成本,提升公司价值,增加股东财富;反之,若薪酬制度设计不当,就很可能使得高管激励失效,导致管理层为追求自身利益而牺牲股

【相似文献】