金字塔控股结构与终极控制者隧道效应研究

发布时间：2018-01-10 11:22

本文关键词：金字塔控股结构与终极控制者隧道效应研究　出处：《商业研究》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：随着我国股权分置改革的完成,终极控股股东对中小股东与上市公司利益的侵占行为呈现出与股权分置改革前诸多不同的特点。基于后股权分置时期2008-2014年连续存在的343家上市家族公司的平衡面板数据,本文应用个体固定效应回归模型分析终极控制者的控制权、现金流权、两权分离度、股权制衡度、控制层级与隧道效应的关系,发现各因素对隧道效应的影响在不同家族企业之间呈现显著差异;隧道效应与终极控制人拥有的控制权比例显著正相关,与现金流权比例显著负相关,与两权分离度显著正相关;外部股东的存在未能有效遏制隧道行为,低负债率的资产结构助长了隧道挖掘动机。因此,应构建低控制权、低现金流权的"双低"股权结构,从权力根源上避免隧道挖掘行为。
[Abstract]:With the completion of the reform of split share structure in China. The behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholder encroaching on the interests of minority shareholders and listed companies is different from that before the reform of split share structure. On the basis of 343 consecutive companies in the period of post-split share structure from 2008 to 2014. Balance panel data for listed family companies. This paper applies the individual fixed effect regression model to analyze the relationship between the ultimate controller's control right, cash flow right, separation degree of two rights, equity balance degree, control level and tunnel effect. It is found that there are significant differences among different family firms in the influence of various factors on tunneling effect. The tunneling effect is significantly positively correlated with the proportion of control rights owned by the ultimate controller, negatively with the proportion of cash flow rights, and positively with the separation degree of the two rights. The existence of external shareholders can not effectively curb the tunneling behavior, and the low debt ratio of the asset structure encourages the tunneling motivation. Therefore, we should construct the "double low" equity structure with low control rights and low cash flow rights. To avoid tunneling behavior from the root of power.
【作者单位】：江南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目,项目编号:71301061 中央高校专项基金项目,项目编号:2015JDZD11
【分类号】：F271;F832.51
【正文快照】： 随着我国股权分置改革的完成,长期制约中国资本市场发展的“同股不同权、同股不同利”的制度与市场结构得到有效优化,深沪A股市场实现“全流通”。股改强化了上市公司各类股东的共同利益基础,控股股东的效用函数发生了改变,致使终极控股股东对中小股东与上市公司利益的侵占行

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