制造商主导下的供应链联合信贷融资模型研究
发布时间:2018-01-14 07:16
本文关键词:制造商主导下的供应链联合信贷融资模型研究 出处:《中国科学技术大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
更多相关文章: 供应链金融 贸易信贷融资 银行信贷融资 信用担保 信贷比例
【摘要】:近些年来,随着市场经营的不确定性,中小企业很难从银行获得贷款,因为他们产生不良贷款和贷款违约的可能性高。而作为银行信贷的替代品,贸易信贷为中小企业提供了供应链融资的机会。在无法获得银行信贷的情况下,为零售商提供延期延迟是制造商刺激销售和减少库存的有效途径,因为它某种意义上代表着促销。截至2015年12月31日,沃尔玛全部应付账款大概占资产负债表总额的60%,大约有385亿美元规模。这些都反映了贸易信贷广泛的使用。因此供应链金融已成为学者和实践从业者都迫切希望研究的领域。基于这样的背景下,本文主要研究联合贸易信贷融资和制造商担保下的银行信贷融资条件下,制造商如何为资金约束的零售商选择融资方式,从而使得制造商自身利润最大。本文涉及三个问题:(1)单融资模式下,制造商和零售商的最优决策和信贷决策;(2)联合融资模式下,制造商和零售商的最优决策和信贷决策;(3)贸易信贷利率和银行信贷利率大小关系对结果的影响。为了解决以上三个问题,本文考虑了单个制造商和单个零售商组成的二层供应链系统,并构成斯坦科尔伯格博弈。制造商资金充足占主导地位,零售商资金受约束,是追随者。制造商可以为零售商决策选择哪种融资方式。主要包括两种融资方式:(1)贸易信贷融资,即零售商预付一部分资金,制造商允许零售商剩余未付款项在销售结束后结算;(2)制造商担保下的银行信贷融资,即零售商从银行获得银行贷款,然后由制造商为融资提供信用担保,如果期末零售商破产无法偿还贷款资金,那么由制造商帮助零售商归还剩余贷款资金。另外零售商决策自身订货量。银行不参与博弈过程,银行也没有资金损失的风险。本文采用理论与实证相结合的研究方法,首先通过理论证明研究了在贸易信贷利率低于银行信贷利率情况下,单信贷融资和双信贷融资下零售商和制造商的最优决策。并发现当生产成本满足一定条件下,联合两种信贷融资可以显著提高制造商的期望利润。然后,再通过实证研究在贸易信贷利率高于银行信贷利率,联合两种信贷模式对制造商最优决策利润的影响。最后,本文发现在双信贷融资模式下,当生产成本较低时,制造商采取利率更低的信贷模式为最优;当生产成本较高时,制造商采取利率更高的信贷模式最优。并且本文从管理启示的角度,给出模型的实践意义,为中小企业运营和融资提供对策参考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the uncertainty of market operation, it is difficult for SMEs to obtain loans from banks because they are highly likely to generate non-performing loans and default on loans, and as a substitute for bank credit. Trade credit provides supply chain financing opportunities for SMEs. In the absence of bank credit, delay delay for retailers is an effective way for manufacturers to stimulate sales and reduce inventories. Because it represents sales in a way, as of December 31st 2015, Wal-Mart 's total accounts payable accounted for about 60% of its total balance sheet. These reflect the widespread use of trade credit. Therefore, supply chain finance has become an area that scholars and practitioners are eager to study. This paper mainly studies how the manufacturer chooses the financing method for the funded retailers under the condition of joint trade credit financing and bank credit financing under the guarantee of manufacturer. This paper deals with the optimal decision and credit decision of manufacturer and retailer under the single financing model. (2) the optimal decision and credit decision of manufacturer and retailer under the mode of co-financing; In order to solve the above three problems, a two-tier supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is considered. And constitute Steinkelberg game. Manufacturers have sufficient capital to dominate, retailer funds are constrained. A follower. The manufacturer can decide which financing method to choose for the retailer. It mainly includes two financing ways: 1) Trade credit financing, that is, the retailer prepaid part of the funds. The manufacturer allows the retailer to settle the remaining outstanding payments after the end of the sale; A bank credit facility guaranteed by the manufacturer, in which the retailer obtains a bank loan from the bank and then the manufacturer provides a credit guarantee for the financing, if the end retailer fails to repay the loan. Then the manufacturer helps the retailer to repay the remaining loan funds. In addition, the retailer decides to order its own quantity. The bank does not participate in the game process. Banks also have no risk of capital loss. This paper uses a combination of theoretical and empirical research methods, first of all through theoretical proof in the case of trade credit interest rate is lower than the bank credit rate. The optimal decision of retailer and manufacturer under single credit financing and double credit financing. It is also found that when the production cost meets certain conditions, the combination of two credit financing can significantly improve the manufacturer's expected profit. Then through the empirical study in the trade credit interest rate higher than the bank credit interest rate, the combination of two credit models on the manufacturer's optimal decision-making profit. Finally, this paper found that under the dual-credit financing model. When the cost of production is low, the manufacturer adopts the credit model with lower interest rate as the best; When the production cost is high, the manufacturer adopts the credit mode with higher interest rate, and this paper gives the practical significance of the model from the angle of management enlightenment, and provides the countermeasure reference for the operation and financing of small and medium-sized enterprises.
【学位授予单位】:中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274;F832.4
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