基于管理层权力理论的上市公司管理层薪酬与真实盈余管理关系研究

发布时间：2018-01-20 10:04

本文关键词： 管理层权力管理层薪酬真实盈余管理　出处：《山东大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：盈余管理始终是研究上市公司的重点和焦点,薪酬动机是诱发盈余管理的重要动机之一,而管理层权力理论又是国外众多研究中用来解释高管薪酬水平、薪酬结构及其变化乃至企业绩效的重要依据。21世纪初会计丑闻的层出不穷,催化了以《萨班斯法案》为代表的法律法规的颁布,规范了会计环境、完善了监管制度。而作为应对,企业的会计行为也从以往的应计项目盈余管理更多地转向真实盈余管理,希望通过这种手段繁多、隐蔽性高的途径最大化个人利益,抬高薪酬。本文从管理层权力理论的视角,借助于Roychowdhury (2006)测度真实盈余管理的模型,选取2008至2012年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,将管理层薪酬从总水平、货币性现金薪酬、股权性薪酬三个角度刻画,研究管理层薪酬与真实盈余管理之问的相互关系。本文的研究结果显示：管理层的总薪酬水平、货币性薪酬、股权性薪酬均与企业的真实盈余管理显著负相关。也就是说,处于经营管理一线的管理层权力过大,获得了对外寻租的自由,真实盈余管理这一间接获利方式就不再是最好的选择。对于注重短期现金收益的管理层来说,他们能在经营管理中得到合理满意的回报,就没有必要进行真实盈余管理；而对于坚持“放长线钓大鱼”的远见管理者而言,更加看重企业的未来发展,真实盈余管理虽能在短期内拉高盈余,却在长期对企业价值有害无益,因此需要得到抑制。在我国,研究管理层薪酬与盈余管理的关系大都以代理理论为基础,较少涉足管理层权力理论。本文的创新之处就在于从管理层权力理论出发,研究管理层薪酬与真实盈余管理的关系,并对其结果进行解释。希望能够丰富真实盈余管理在中国的研究内容,为防范、识别、治理真实盈余管理提供向导,维护利益相关者的利益,规范市场运作。
[Abstract]:Earnings management has always been the focus and focus of research on listed companies, compensation motivation is one of the important motivations to induce earnings management, and management power theory is used to explain executive compensation level in many foreign studies. The endless emergence of accounting scandals at the beginning of the 21st century catalyzes the promulgation of laws and regulations represented by Sarbanes Act and standardizes the accounting environment. Improve the regulatory system. And as a response, the accounting behavior of enterprises from the previous accrual items earnings management more to the real earnings management, the hope is that through this means a variety of. This paper measures the real earnings management model from the perspective of management power theory, with the aid of Roychowdhury / 2006. From 2008 to 2012, the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are selected to describe the management compensation from three angles: total level, monetary cash compensation and equity compensation. This paper studies the relationship between management compensation and real earnings management. The results of this study show that: the total salary level of management, monetary compensation, equity compensation are significantly negative correlation with the real earnings management. The management in the line of management is too powerful to obtain the freedom to rent out, the real earnings management is no longer the best way of indirect profit. For the management who pay attention to short-term cash returns. If they can get reasonable satisfactory returns in management, there is no need for real earnings management; But for the visionary managers who insist on "long-term fishing", they attach more importance to the future development of enterprises. Although real earnings management can increase earnings in the short term, it is harmful to the value of enterprises in the long run. Therefore, it needs to be suppressed. In China, the relationship between management compensation and earnings management is mostly based on agency theory, less involved in management power theory. The innovation of this paper is based on management power theory. This paper studies the relationship between management compensation and real earnings management, and explains the results. It hopes to enrich the research content of real earnings management in China and provide guidance for the prevention, identification and governance of real earnings management. Maintain the interests of stakeholders and regulate the operation of the market.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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