自由现金流量、代理成本与股权激励计划选择

发布时间：2018-01-21 06:55

本文关键词： 自由现金流量代理成本股权激励内部人控制　出处：《安徽财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：西方发达资本主义国家已经在实践中证实,股权激励制度作为一项重大的激励机制创新,在降低公司所有者和经营者之间的代理成本、提升公司价值和推动经济发展等方面发挥了重要作用。相比在国外取得的巨大成功和广泛应用,股权激励体制在我国的起步较晚。2005年的股权分置改革,解决了制约中国资本市场发展的重大制度性缺陷,为股权激励的实施扫除了制度层面的障碍。近几年,随着有关股权激励制度的法律法规的出台,我国的股权激励制度走上了规范化的道路,但是,股权激励计划在我国上市公司,特别是国有公司中的实施比例相对较低,使股权激励制度这种优良的长期激励机制不能为提升我国上市公司的价值和促进经济发展做出贡献。学者们对自由现金流量的经济后果和股权激励的影响因素都有研究,但是将两者结合起来并考虑公司治理机制对两者之间关系的影响的研究很少。以此为启示,采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方式,探讨自由现金流量、代理成本与股权激励计划选择的关系,以及公司治理机制对两者之间关系的影响,具有一定意义。在规范研究部分,对国内外相关研究成果进行了梳理、归纳与整理。同时,对相关理论进行了概述,并结合理论对自由现金流量、代理成本与股权激励计划选择的关系,以及公司治理机制对自由现金流量与股权激励计划选择关系的影响进行了理论分析,为实证研究模型的设计提供了有力的支撑。在实证研究部分,选取了2006年至2012年我国A股上市公司数据作为研究样本。首先,对样本数据进行描述性统计分析和相关性分析；然后,对全样本和国有公司样本进行多元LOGISTIC回归分析。根据回归结果进行比较分析,得出以下研究结果：(1)自由现金流量越多的上市公司,越不倾向于选择股权激励计划,对于国有、所处地区市场化程度低和非两职合一的公司而言,自由现金流量越多的上市公司,更加不倾向于选择股权激励计划。(2)对于国有公司,市场化程度低、董事会独立性低和股权制衡度低的国有公司,自由现金流量越多,公司更加不倾向于选择股权激励计划。基于以上研究结果,可以得出以下启示：加快市场化进程、培育职业经理人市场、发挥银行的债权人治理作用、深化国有公司组织关系改革、强化信息披露机制、强制现金分红、完善公司内部治理结构。
[Abstract]:Western developed capitalist countries have confirmed in practice that the equity incentive system as a major incentive mechanism innovation, in reducing the cost of agency between the owner and operator of the company. Compared with the great success and extensive application in foreign countries, the equity incentive system started later in our country. In 2005, the reform of split share structure was carried out. It solves the major institutional defects that restrict the development of China's capital market, and removes the institutional barriers for the implementation of equity incentive. In recent years, with the introduction of laws and regulations on equity incentive system. The equity incentive system of our country has taken the standardized road, however, the proportion of the equity incentive plan in the listed companies, especially the state-owned companies, is relatively low. This fine long-term incentive mechanism can not contribute to the promotion of the value and economic development of listed companies in China. Both the economic consequences of free cash flow and the influencing factors of equity incentive are discussed by scholars. There's research. However, there are few studies on the relationship between the two by combining the two and considering the impact of corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between them. This paper uses the combination of normative research and empirical research to explore the free cash flow. The relationship between agency cost and the choice of equity incentive plan, and the influence of corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between them are of certain significance. In the normative research part, the related research results at home and abroad are combed, summarized and sorted out. At the same time, the related theories are summarized, and the free cash flow is combined with the theory. The relationship between agency cost and stock incentive plan selection, and the influence of corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between free cash flow and equity incentive plan selection are analyzed theoretically. In the part of empirical research, we choose the data of A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2012 as the research sample. Descriptive statistical analysis and correlation analysis of sample data; Then, the multivariate LOGISTIC regression analysis of the total sample and the state-owned company sample is carried out. According to the regression results, the following research results: 1) the more the free cash flow is, the more listed companies are. The less inclined to choose the equity incentive plan, for the state-owned companies with low degree of marketization and non-two-position integration, the more free cash flow of listed companies. For state-owned companies with low marketization, low board independence and low equity checks and balances, the more free cash flow. Companies are less inclined to opt for equity incentives. Based on the above research results, we can draw the following enlightenment: speed up the process of marketization, cultivate the market of professional managers, give play to the role of creditor governance of banks, deepen the reform of the organizational relationship of state-owned companies. Strengthen information disclosure mechanism, force cash dividends, and improve the company's internal governance structure.
【学位授予单位】：安徽财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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