中国上市公司研发投资与高管薪酬的研究分析

发布时间：2018-01-24 03:07

本文关键词： 研发投资高管薪酬基于行为的激励机制　出处：《复旦大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：企业高级管理层与股东的委托代理矛盾一直是学术界研究的热点。合理高效的高管薪酬制度可以激励和约束公司高管行为,使其实现股东财富最大化的目标,从而解决代理问题。研究表明,基于高管行为的薪酬机制有利于缓解高管与股东的委托代理冲突,并促使高管做出正确的研发投资决策。将高管薪酬与研发投资行为而非研发行为的结果相联系时,会减少高管们所承担的业绩波动风险,使他们更专注于做出正确的研发投资决策,愿意将公司资源投入能带来未来不确定回报的投资项目,从而提高公司的科技创新力和公司竞争力。本文以中国上市公司研发投资与高管薪酬的关系为研究对象,探究中国上市公司基于研发投资的高管激励机制。本文在我国高管薪酬制度演变与企业研发投资关系分析的基础上,基于技术创新理论、委托代理理论、激励理论,提出我国上市公司研发强度对高管薪酬的影响以及影响高管薪酬研发强度敏感性的研究假设。实证研究时,本文选取了2009年至2012年沪深两市A股1028家上市公司2077个研究样本。通过构建多元回归模型,本文首先探究企业研发强度对高管薪酬是否产生影响,并进一步研究在高科技公司、非国有企业、公司业绩优良、管理层权力较小的公司,企业研发强度对高管薪酬的影响是否显著高于非高科技公司、国有企业、业绩差的公司和管理层权力较大的公司。最后,本文得出结论,我国上市公司的研发强度对高管薪酬有显著的影响；高科技公司研发强度对高管薪酬的影响显著高于非高科技公司；非国有企业研发强度对高管薪酬的影响显著高于国有企业；业绩优良的公司研发强度对高管薪酬的影响显著高于业绩差的公司；管理层权力大的公司研发强度对高管薪酬的影响显著高于管理层权力小的公司。国内外仅有的对于研发强度与高管薪酬的关系的研究都致力于将高管薪酬作为自变量,探究高管薪酬对研发强度的影响。本文将研发强度作为影响高管薪酬的因素进行实证研究,探究了基于研发投资的高管激励机制,填补了学术界研究的空白。同时,前人对于研发强度与高管薪酬关系的研究并未区分公司的行业、实际控制人性质、业绩和公司治理特征的影响,本文分别探究了在高科技公司、非国有企业、公司业绩优良、管理层权力较小这四种情况下,企业研发投入对高管薪酬的影响是否显著高于非高科技公司、国有企业、业绩差的公司和管理层权力较大的公司,本文的研究成果能启示不同类型的公司因地制宜的制定高管薪酬激励机制。
[Abstract]:The contradiction between senior management and stockholders is always a hot topic in academia. A reasonable and efficient executive compensation system can motivate and restrain the behavior of senior executives to achieve the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. In order to solve the agency problem. The research shows that the compensation mechanism based on executive behavior is helpful to alleviate the principal-agent conflict between executives and shareholders. It also urges executives to make the right decision on R & D investment. Linking executive compensation with R & D investment behavior rather than R & D behavior results will reduce the risk of performance volatility. Make them more focused on making the right R & D investment decisions, willing to invest the company's resources in investment projects that will bring future uncertain returns. In order to improve the scientific and technological innovation and competitiveness of the company. This paper focuses on the relationship between R & D investment and executive compensation of listed companies in China. On the basis of the analysis of the relationship between the evolution of the executive compensation system and the R & D investment of enterprises, based on the theory of technological innovation, the principal-agent theory. Incentive theory, put forward the impact of R & D intensity of listed companies on executive compensation and the impact of executive compensation R & D intensity sensitivity of research hypotheses. This paper selects 2077 samples of 1028 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2012, and constructs a multivariate regression model. This paper first explores the impact of R & D intensity on executive compensation, and further studies in high-tech companies, non-state-owned enterprises, companies with good performance, management power is small. Whether the impact of R & D intensity on executive compensation is significantly higher than that of non-high-tech companies, state-owned enterprises, poor performance companies and management power companies. Finally, this paper draws a conclusion. The R & D intensity of listed companies in China has a significant impact on executive compensation; The impact of R & D intensity on executive compensation of high-tech companies is significantly higher than that of non-high-tech companies; The impact of R & D intensity of non-state-owned enterprises on executive compensation is significantly higher than that of state-owned enterprises; The effect of R & D intensity on executive compensation is significantly higher than that of underperformance companies. The impact of R & D intensity on executive compensation is significantly higher in companies with large management power than in those with less management power. The only research on the relationship between R & D intensity and executive compensation at home and abroad is devoted to the study of executive compensation as a self-help. Variable. To explore the impact of executive compensation on R & D intensity. This paper takes R & D intensity as the factor of influencing executive compensation and explores the incentive mechanism based on R & D investment. At the same time, the former research on the relationship between R & D intensity and executive compensation is not the regional branch of the industry, the actual control of the nature of people, performance and corporate governance characteristics of the impact. This paper explores whether R & D investment has a significantly higher impact on executive compensation in high-tech companies, non-state-owned enterprises, companies with good performance, less management power, whether the impact of corporate R & D investment is significantly higher than that of non-high-tech companies. The research results of this paper can enlighten different types of companies to formulate executive compensation incentive mechanism according to local conditions.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F272.92;F832.51

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