股权结构、关联交易与企业价值研究

发布时间：2018-01-30 20:36

本文关键词： 股权结构关联交易企业价值　出处：《东北农业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：关联交易作为上市公司非常重要而普遍的经济活动,对企业的影响非常深远。关联交易在充分利用企业集团资源来降低交易的成本,增加企业价值的同时,也能通过交易条件或者相对较低的交易价格从而形成非公允关联交易,大股东利用非公允的关联交易来转移企业的资源、利润导致中小股东的利益被侵占,从而降低企业的价值。在关联交易的决策过程中股东是重要的参与者,因而股权的集中度、制衡度在关联交易中有着至关重要的作用,关联交易的经济后果直接影响到企业的价值。因此,研究股权的结构、关联交易与企业价值有着重要的现实意义。本文以股权结构、关联交易与企业价值的研究为主题。以上市公司为研究对象,主要研究股权结构与关联交易的相关性,股权结构、关联交易与企业价值的相关性,为此进行如下分析研究： (1)本文在回顾已有研究成果的基础上对股权结构、关联交易、企业价值和概念进行深入阐述。 (2)描述性的统计分析我国上市公司的股权结构现状及其特点以及关联交易的现状。 (3)基于“代理理论”、“交易费用理论”、“掏空理论”分析股权结构与关联交易有什么关系,进一步分析扩展到股股权结构和关联交易与企业价值有什么关系,并提出假设。 (4)构建回归模型并以发生关联交易的上市公司的有关数据为基础,运用SPSS软件实证检验提出的假设。 (5)实证结果显示：股权集中度与关联交易的规模显著正相关,表明随着控股股东在公司的控制力增加,企业受控股股东的控制会频繁进行关联交易来以达到收益最大化的目标；股权制衡度同关联交易的规模呈现负性相关并且显著,表明制衡度越高,控股股东越难利用关联交易获取私利,关联交易的发生规模也会随之减少；关联交易的规模也同企业价值呈现负性相关并且显著,同时股权集中同企业价值度呈现负性相关,说明上股权相对集中时,控股股东为了追求私人利益而进行的非理性的关联交易存在侵害中小股东利益,或者转移公司资产、利益的“掏空”行为降低企业的价值；企业价值与股权制衡度正相关与关联交易的规模负相关且显著,这证明由于能有其他的控股股东能与控股股东抗衡时,则大股东在监督控股股东同时也能够有效的制约其行为,以此实现降低代理成本,由于监督制约机制的有效可以是其他股东及相关者的利益的大保护,同时严格执行上市公司的决策进而公司的目标,对企业价值起到正面积极的作用；非公允的关联交易与企业价值负相关,但不显著,控股股东的剩余收益优势不明显时,控股股东会通过关联交易把公司的资源、财产转移到能获得更多收益关联方去,降低了企业价值。 (6)最后本文依据实证分析的结果提出建议。
[Abstract]:As a very important and universal economic activity of listed companies, affiliated transactions have a very far-reaching impact on enterprises. While making full use of enterprise group resources to reduce transaction costs and increase the value of enterprises. Through trading conditions or relatively low transaction price to form unfair related party transactions, large shareholders use unfair related party transactions to transfer the resources of enterprises, resulting in the interests of small and medium shareholders being encroached. In order to reduce the value of enterprises, shareholders are important participants in the decision-making process of related party transactions, so the concentration of equity, the degree of checks and balances plays a vital role in related party transactions. The economic consequences of related party transactions directly affect the value of enterprises. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the structure of equity, related party transactions and enterprise value. Taking listed companies as the research object, this paper mainly studies the correlation between equity structure and related party transactions, equity structure, and the correlation between related transaction and enterprise value. To this end, the following analytical studies have been carried out: On the basis of reviewing the existing research results, this paper elaborates the ownership structure, related transaction, enterprise value and concept. (2) descriptive statistical analysis of the status quo and characteristics of the equity structure of listed companies in China and the current situation of related party transactions. Based on "agency theory", "transaction cost theory", "tunneling theory" to analyze the relationship between ownership structure and related party transactions. This paper further analyzes the relationship between the stock ownership structure and related party transactions and the enterprise value, and puts forward some hypotheses. Finally, a regression model is constructed and based on the relevant data of listed companies with related transactions, the hypothesis is tested by using SPSS software. The empirical results show that the degree of ownership concentration is significantly positively correlated with the scale of related party transactions, indicating that with the increase of controlling power of controlling shareholders in the company. Under the control of controlling shareholders, enterprises often carry out related party transactions in order to achieve the goal of maximization of income. The degree of equity balance is negatively correlated with the scale of related party transactions, indicating that the higher the degree of checks and balances is, the more difficult it is for controlling shareholders to obtain private benefits by using related party transactions, and the scale of related party transactions will be reduced accordingly; The scale of related party transactions is also negative and significant correlation with the value of the enterprise, while the concentration of equity and the degree of enterprise value is negative, indicating that the equity is relatively concentrated. In order to pursue the private interests, the controlling shareholders' irrational related party transactions infringe upon the interests of the minority shareholders, or transfer the assets of the company, and the "tunneling" behavior of the interests reduces the value of the enterprises; The positive correlation between enterprise value and equity balance degree is negatively correlated with the scale of related party transactions, which proves that there are other controlling shareholders who can compete with controlling shareholders. The majority shareholders in the supervision of the controlling shareholders can also effectively restrict their behavior, so as to achieve the reduction of agency costs, because the effectiveness of the supervision and control mechanism can be the interests of other shareholders and stakeholders to protect. At the same time, strictly implement the decision of listed companies and then the objectives of the company, and play a positive role in the value of enterprises; The unfair related party transaction has negative correlation with the enterprise value, but it is not significant. When the residual income advantage of the controlling shareholder is not obvious, the controlling shareholder will transfer the company's resources through the related party transaction. The transfer of property to more income-related parties reduces the value of the enterprise. Finally, based on the results of empirical analysis, this paper puts forward some suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：东北农业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

【共引文献】