纵向兼任高管对上市公司会计信息质量的影响

发布时间：2018-02-01 07:20

本文关键词： 纵向兼任会计信息质量掏空理论委托代理　出处：《会计之友》2017年20期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：高管兼任作为大股东加强上市公司控制权的手段,在经济转型期是广泛存在的现象。通过对已有兼任高管研究文献进行梳理,发现已有研究仅仅局限于独立企业横向层面的兼任,而忽视了大股东公司与上市公司之间纵向兼任高管的经济后果研究。文章基于纵向兼任高管视角,运用委托代理理论和掏空理论,对我国纵向兼任高管的经济后果进行分析,发现无论是从大股东监管还是大股东掏空方面,纵向兼任高管对上市公司会计信息质量都有很大影响,对此,提出了在纵向兼任高管下提高上市公司会计信息质量的建议。
[Abstract]:As a means for large shareholders to strengthen the control rights of listed companies, executive co-appointment is a widespread phenomenon in the economic transition period. Found that the existing research is limited to the horizontal level of independent enterprises, while ignoring the economic consequences of vertical co-appointment between large shareholder companies and listed companies. The article is based on the perspective of vertical concurrent executives. By using the principal-agent theory and tunneling theory, this paper analyzes the economic consequences of the vertical co-employment of senior executives in China, and finds out whether from the supervision of large shareholders or emptying of large shareholders. Vertical co-appointment of executives has a great impact on the quality of accounting information of listed companies. In view of this, the paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies under the vertical co-appointment of executives.
【作者单位】：天津商业大学商学院;
【分类号】：F272.91;F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 随着企业两权分离现象的出现,代理成本很大程度上降低了公司的组织效率。为了解决委托代理问题,国内外学者纷纷提出了大股东的治理作用。在中国,大股东通过兼任高管强化控制权的现象同样广泛存在。由于我国仍处于经济转型期,投资者保护水平低,法律制约相对薄弱,大股东兼任的作

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