多个大股东能否降低公司债务融资成本

发布时间：2018-03-19 23:01

本文选题：多个大股东　切入点：债务融资成本　出处：《世界经济》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以2003-2014年的中国上市公司为样本,检验了多个大股东对公司债务融资成本的影响。结果表明,具有多个大股东的公司债务融资成本更低。该结论在控制内生性后依然成立。我们发现与监督假说一致,当公司内大股东数量越多、非控股大股东持股越多、大股东间持股分散度越低时,大股东更容易发挥监督作用,公司的债务融资成本越低。此外,当公司信息环境更好、公司所处地区法律环境更好时,大股东更容易发挥监督作用,多个大股东与债务融资成本间的负向关系也更加明显。本文从债务融资成本视角,为股权结构安排的经济后果提供了一定的证据支持。
[Abstract]:Based on the sample of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2014, this paper examines the influence of several large shareholders on the debt financing costs of the companies. The results show that, Debt financing costs of companies with multiple large shareholders are lower. This conclusion is still true after controlling endogeneity. We found that the more large shareholders in the company, the more the holding of non-controlling large shareholders. The lower the degree of dispersion among large shareholders, the easier it is for large shareholders to play a supervisory role and the lower the cost of debt financing for a company. In addition, when the information environment of the company is better and the legal environment of the region where the company is located is better, It is easier for large shareholders to play a supervisory role, and the negative relationship between large shareholders and debt financing costs is more obvious. This paper provides some evidences for the economic consequences of equity structure arrangement from the perspective of debt financing cost.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院博士后流动站;中国华融资产管理股份有限公司博士后科研工作站;中国人民大学商学院;
【基金】：中国人民大学中央高校建设世界一流大学(学科)和特色发展引导专项资金(16XNL007)的资助
【分类号】：F275.3;F832.51

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