CEO权力、媒体关注与过度投资关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-24 12:48

  本文选题：CEO权力 + 媒体关注　； 参考：《西北大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：当前,中国经济处于转轨时期,投资作为带动经济增长的“三驾马车”之一,在推动中国经济平稳转轨,实现又好又快发展进程中发挥着举足轻重的作用。投资效率,从宏观角度而言,影响资本市场资源配置效率及国家经济的发展;从微观企业而言,损害了股东及公司价值,造成资源浪费。过度投资作为一种非效率投资,指企业把资金投向了净现值(NPV)为负的项目,这会带来一系列恶劣后果。两权分离的现代企业制度,公司CEO权力过于集中,其有可能将自身利益凌驾于股东利益之上,利用权力寻租,引发公司过度投资行为。在信息化浪潮推进和互联网普及的信息时代,媒体从舆论宣传角色过渡到社会治理角色,在企业层面表现为媒体对企业进行信息报道和社会监督。媒体关注成为公司外部监督的一种重要力量,连接着企业、市场和投资者,有可能约束CEO权力的过度膨胀和寻租行为。本文选取2011年至2015年中国沪深两市A股上市公司数据为样本,考察了 CEO权力对企业过度投资问题的影响,并检验媒体关注如何影响CEO权力与企业过度投资之间的关系,最后,进一步考察了上述影响关系在不同制度环境下的差异。研究发现,CEO权力越大,上市公司过度投资行为越严重;媒体关注能够降低CEO权力—过度投资的敏感性,即,媒体关注能够有效抑制CEO权力引发的过度投资;在其他条件一定的情况下,相比于制度环境“差”的地区,制度环境“好”的地区媒体关注抑制CEO权力引发的过度投资效果更显著。该研究对于提高上市公司的投资效率,扩展媒体关注治理作用以及制度环境建设,具有重要的理论和现实意义。
[Abstract]:At present, China's economy is in a transitional period. Investment, as one of the "troika" that drives economic growth, plays an important role in promoting the smooth transition of China's economy and realizing the process of sound and rapid development. Investment efficiency, from a macro point of view, affects the efficiency of resource allocation in the capital market and the development of the national economy, while from the micro enterprise perspective, it damages the value of shareholders and companies and causes waste of resources. Overinvestment, as an inefficient investment, refers to projects in which companies invest their funds in NPV (net present value), which can bring about a series of adverse consequences. In the modern enterprise system with the separation of two rights, the CEO power of the company is too centralized, which may put its own interests above the interests of the shareholders, and make use of the power to seek rent, which leads to the over-investment behavior of the company. In the information age with the information tide advancing and the Internet popularizing, the media transition from the role of public opinion and propaganda to the role of social governance, and at the enterprise level, the media carries on the information report and the social supervision to the enterprise. Media attention has become an important force in the external supervision of the company, connecting enterprises, markets and investors, which may constrain the excessive expansion of CEO power and rent-seeking behavior. From 2011 to 2015, the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China are selected as samples to examine the influence of CEO power on corporate overinvestment, and to examine how the media pay attention to the relationship between CEO power and corporate overinvestment. The differences of the above-mentioned influence relations in different institutional environments are further investigated. The study found that the greater the CEO power, the more serious the overinvestment behavior of listed companies, the more sensitive the CEO power-over-investment can be reduced by media attention, that is, media attention can effectively restrain the over-investment caused by CEO power. Under certain conditions, the regional media with "good institutional environment" pay more attention to the suppression of excessive investment caused by CEO power than the regions where the institutional environment is "poor". This research has important theoretical and practical significance for improving the investment efficiency of listed companies, expanding media attention to the role of governance and institutional environment construction.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
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本文编号：1929113