创业板上市公司的现金分红政策悖论——基于股利掏空理论的解释

发布时间：2018-05-28 13:56

本文选题：创业板 + 现金股利　；参考：《中国经济问题》2017年02期

【摘要】：本文针对我国创业板公司IPO后大比例现金分红的现象进行了实证研究,认为对于创业型企业上市后随即大幅现金分红,属于与企业成长性相违背的悖论,论文探讨了其成因和后果。研究发现,企业在IPO时的资金超募比例越高、控股股东持股比例越大,现金股利支付率越高;控股股东减持股票,现金股利支付率并没有降低;股利分配预案公告对公司长期股价产生显著的负向影响。研究证据支持了由代理成本理论出发的股利政策假说。本文的结论是:在新股发行制度尚未完善的背景下,创业板上市公司的控股股东利用超募资金进行大比例的现金分红,损害了中小股东的长远利益。这一结论对于完善新股发行制度及加大中小投资者权益保护具有重要意义,对未来的创业板企业再融资政策制定亦有启示。
[Abstract]:This paper makes an empirical study on the phenomenon of a large proportion of cash dividends after the growth Enterprise Board (IPO) in our country, and holds that the cash dividend distribution for the entrepreneurial enterprises immediately after listing is a paradox contrary to the growth of the enterprises. The paper discusses its causes and consequences. The study found that the higher the proportion of capital overraising in IPO, the larger the controlling shareholder's holding ratio, the higher the cash dividend payment rate, the less the controlling shareholder's holding of the stock, the less the cash dividend payment rate; Dividend distribution notice has a significant negative impact on the long-term stock price of the company. The evidence supports the dividend policy hypothesis based on agency cost theory. The conclusion of this paper is: under the background that the new issue system is not perfect, the controlling shareholders of the gem make use of the excess funds to carry out a large proportion of cash dividends, which damages the long-term interests of the minority shareholders. This conclusion is of great significance to the improvement of the new issue system and to the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors, as well as to the formulation of refinancing policies for gem enterprises in the future.
【作者单位】：新疆财经大学金融学院;上海财经大学金融学院;上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科项目(12YJA790074) 国家社科基金项目(13BJL038) 博士后科学基金项目(2013M540667) 新疆财经大学科研创新团队项目(2015XTD001)的资助
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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