上市公司股权激励公告日的时机选择

发布时间：2018-06-05 05:49

本文选题：股权激励 + 机会主义行为　；参考：《上海交通大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：很多国内外的理论与实证研究都表明，股权激励对于改善委托-代理问题、提升公司业绩有着显著的正效应。但也有很多学者指出股权激励容易诱发管理层的机会主义行为，去追求个人利益的最大化而非公司价值最大化，，其中就包括盈余管理和时机选择。在监管机制相对完善的西方成熟市场，股权激励实施过程中尚会出现各种各样的管理层机会主义行为。在现阶段将该种机制引入我国，其有效性引起了众多学者的质疑。本文选取了2008年1月1日至2012年12月31日首次进行股权激励草案公告的245家A股上市公司作为研究对象，旨在通过事件研究法来检验管理层是否会利用自身的信息优势、尤其是对于盈余数据的信息优势来对股权激励草案的公告日进行时机选择。实证结果表明：即使不考虑股权激励本身带来的短期效应，股权激励草案公告日也更可能出现在股价低点，说明管理层更倾向于在好消息之前、坏消息之后推出股权激励计划；进一步的研究则表明管理层的确利用了自身对于公司盈余数据的信息优势来对草案公告日进行时机选择，结果在1%的水平上显著。本文认为，原本是为了激励管理层努力提高公司绩效的股权激励制度，会在不完善的监管制度下演变为管理层寻租的工具，因此现如今上市公司大规模地使用这一工具，其动机与有效性存疑。
[Abstract]:Many theoretical and empirical studies at home and abroad show that equity incentive has a significant positive effect on improving the principal-agent problem and corporate performance. However, many scholars have pointed out that equity incentive is apt to induce opportunistic behavior of management and pursue the maximization of personal benefits rather than the maximization of corporate value, including earnings management and timing. In the mature western market where the regulatory mechanism is relatively perfect, there will still be a variety of managerial opportunism in the implementation of equity incentives. At present, the mechanism is introduced into China, and its validity has been questioned by many scholars. From January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012, 245 A-share listed companies are selected as the research objects. The purpose of this study is to test whether the management will take advantage of their own information advantages through event research. Especially for the information advantage of earnings data to choose the timing of the announcement date of stock incentive draft. The empirical results show that even if the short-term effect of equity incentive itself is not taken into account, the announcement date of stock incentive draft is more likely to appear at the low price of stock price, indicating that management is more inclined to launch equity incentive plan before good news and after bad news; Further studies show that the management does use its own information advantage for earnings data to choose the timing of the draft announcement date, and the results are significant at the level of 1%. This paper argues that the equity incentive system, which was originally designed to motivate management to improve corporate performance, will evolve into a management rent-seeking tool under an imperfect regulatory system, so now listed companies use this tool on a large scale. Its motive and validity are doubtful.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92

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