基于多任务代理模型的P2P网贷平台治理研究
发布时间：2018-12-28 18:07
【摘要】：运用多任务代理模型,将财务绩效和发展能力作为政府(委托人)激励P2P网贷平台(代理人)发展的两个维度,分析政府对网贷平台的最优激励契约,以及网贷平台在经济绩效与发展能力两项任务的激励优化问题。研究表明,当网贷平台发展能力不确定性较大时,政府应该增加监督成本,完善相关法律法规,增加信息透明度,提高激励效力。诚然,政府应当依据经济绩效和发展能力两项任务之间激励成本的依存关系,调整对经济绩效任务的激励强度,提升网贷平台的发展能力。因此,政府应该针对网贷平台的市场环境、成长时期和规模,采取不同的激励方案,从而实现对网贷平台的有效激励。
[Abstract]:Using the multi-task agent model, the financial performance and development ability are regarded as the two dimensions of government (principal) incentive P2P network loan platform (agent) development, and the government's optimal incentive contract to the network loan platform is analyzed. And the incentive optimization problem of the net loan platform in the two tasks of economic performance and development ability. The research shows that the government should increase the supervision cost, perfect the relevant laws and regulations, increase the information transparency and improve the incentive effectiveness when the development ability of the network loan platform is uncertain. To be sure, the government should adjust the incentive intensity of economic performance task according to the dependence of incentive cost between economic performance and development ability, and enhance the development ability of network loan platform. Therefore, the government should adopt different incentive schemes according to the market environment, growth period and scale of the net loan platform, so as to realize the effective incentive to the network loan platform.
【作者单位】： 济南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目(16BJY016) 山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2012GL01)
【分类号】：F724.6;F832.4
，
本文编号：2394258
[Abstract]:Using the multi-task agent model, the financial performance and development ability are regarded as the two dimensions of government (principal) incentive P2P network loan platform (agent) development, and the government's optimal incentive contract to the network loan platform is analyzed. And the incentive optimization problem of the net loan platform in the two tasks of economic performance and development ability. The research shows that the government should increase the supervision cost, perfect the relevant laws and regulations, increase the information transparency and improve the incentive effectiveness when the development ability of the network loan platform is uncertain. To be sure, the government should adjust the incentive intensity of economic performance task according to the dependence of incentive cost between economic performance and development ability, and enhance the development ability of network loan platform. Therefore, the government should adopt different incentive schemes according to the market environment, growth period and scale of the net loan platform, so as to realize the effective incentive to the network loan platform.
【作者单位】： 济南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目(16BJY016) 山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2012GL01)
【分类号】：F724.6;F832.4
，
本文编号：2394258
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