投资者保护视角下交叉上市与非效率投资的实证研究

发布时间：2019-01-04 10:30

【摘要】：随着经济全球化趋势的日益加深，以及各国金融市场发展不均衡等问题的存在，企业寻求境外交叉上市的动机与渴求越来越强烈。境外交叉上市由此产生，至今仍方兴未艾，而且成为学术研究领域的一大主题。国外学者对于境外交叉上市的研究由来已久而且理论成果颇丰，如投资者认知假说、市场分割假说、流动性假说和投资者保护假说等。随着研究的不断深入，人们对于投资者保护问题的关注日益增多。在以往文献中，学者大多从境内外法律制度差异的视角进行研究，经济层面的研究相对较少。因此，本课题基于投资者保护视角，从企业的资本配置行为入手，结合交叉上市前后企业所面临法律环境的变化及其对公司治理机制的影响，深入分析交叉上市对企业非效率投资行为的影响。考察A+H交叉上市是否发挥了其治理效应，有效制约了上市公司的非效率投资行为，提高了对投资者的保护程度。本课题首先就交叉上市和中小投资者做了界定，对交叉上市和非效率投资的相关文献进行了详细的回顾与梳理；随后比较了香港与内地法律制度环境的差异以及这些差异对两地公司治理机制的影响；然后基于控股股东对控制权私有收益的追求，构建数理模型并得到一条投资决策无差异曲线，研究交叉上市对企业投资决策的影响。基于以上理论基础，提出了交叉上市可以有效制约企业非效率投资行为的一系列假设，借鉴并改进了Vogt(1994)模型、搜集整理数据、回归分析、并根据研究结论提出了一些政策建议。本课题理论分析表明：交叉上市可以有效制约因控股股东对控制权私有收益的追求，而导致的非理性过度投资行为。实证分析表明：(1)A+H交叉上市公司投资现金流敏感性低于纯A股公司；(2)A+H交叉上市可以在一定程度上有效制约企业过度投资的非效率行为；(3)随着自由现金流的增加，投资支出与现金流之间的敏感性也不断增强，企业过度投资的程度也越来越大，，交叉上市对过度投资的制约作用呈现增强的趋势，但是并不显著，现阶段交叉上市对企业因现金流过剩导致的过度投资行为的制约作用仍然有限，尚有较大的提升空间；(4)随着股权集中度的增加，投资支出与现金流之间的敏感性不断降低，企业过度投资的程度也越来越小，而且交叉上市对过度投资的制约作用，并未随着股权集中度的增加呈现某种规律性变动。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of the trend of economic globalization and the existence of unbalanced development of financial markets in various countries, the motivation and desire of enterprises to seek cross-listing abroad is becoming stronger and stronger. Cross-listing has emerged from this, still in the ascendant, and has become a major subject of academic research. Foreign scholars have been studying cross-listing overseas for a long time and have a lot of theoretical achievements, such as investor cognition hypothesis, market segmentation hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis and investor protection hypothesis. With the deepening of the research, people pay more and more attention to investor protection. In the previous literature, scholars mostly studied from the perspective of the differences of domestic and foreign legal systems, but relatively few on the economic level. Therefore, based on the perspective of investor protection, from the perspective of corporate capital allocation behavior, combined with the cross-listing before and after the changes in the legal environment faced by enterprises and their impact on corporate governance mechanism, Deeply analyze the influence of cross-listing on the non-efficient investment behavior of enterprises. Whether A-H cross-listing exerts its governance effect effectively restricts the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies and improves the degree of investor protection. This paper first defines cross-listing and small and medium-sized investors, and reviews and combs the related literature of cross-listing and inefficient investment in detail. Then it compares the differences between the legal systems of Hong Kong and the mainland and the impact of these differences on the corporate governance mechanism of the two places. Then, based on the controlling shareholder's pursuit of private income of control right, the mathematical model is constructed and a non-differential curve of investment decision is obtained, and the influence of cross-listing on enterprise investment decision is studied. Based on the above theoretical basis, this paper puts forward a series of hypotheses that cross-listing can effectively restrict the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises, and improves the Vogt (1994) model, collects and collates the data, and analyzes the results of regression analysis. According to the conclusions of the study, some policy suggestions are put forward. The theoretical analysis shows that cross-listing can effectively restrict the irrational over-investment behavior caused by controlling shareholders' pursuit of private income of control. The empirical analysis shows that: (1) the sensitivity of) A H cross-listed companies to investment cash flow is lower than that of pure A-share companies; (2) A H cross-listing can effectively restrict the inefficient behavior of over-investment of enterprises to some extent; (3) with the increase of free cash flow, the sensitivity between investment expenditure and cash flow is increasing, and the degree of overinvestment is increasing. However, the cross-listing still has a limited effect on the over-investment behavior caused by excess cash flow at this stage, and there is still much room for improvement. (4) with the increase of equity concentration, the sensitivity between investment expenditure and cash flow is decreasing, the degree of overinvestment is becoming smaller and smaller, and cross-listing restricts over-investment. It does not show some regular change with the increase of ownership concentration.
【学位授予单位】：重庆理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F271;F275;F832.51

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