委托贷款对借贷关系和社会资金配置的影响——现实与理论的偏离
发布时间：2019-03-08 12:43
【摘要】：近年来,我国商业银行的委托贷款规模不断扩大,对借贷关系和社会资金配置产生了明显影响。委托贷款作为商业银行的中间业务,拉长了委托人与借款人之间的委托代理关系,增加了社会资金的配置成本,降低了社会资源配置效率;委托人对借款人的监督比商业银行更有激励和效率;委托贷款对金融资源错配的纠偏作用可能会增加社会资源配置成本。所以,从宏观视角来看,委托贷款的司法设计并非经济学上的最优设计,如果商业银行从委托人与借款人之间的借贷关系中退出,通过市场化设计允许企业间的直接借贷,可能会提高整体社会福利。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the scale of entrusted loans of commercial banks in China has been expanding, which has a significant impact on the relationship between loans and the allocation of social funds. As the intermediary business of commercial banks, entrustment loan lengthens the principal-agent relationship between principal and borrower, increases the allocation cost of social funds, and reduces the efficiency of social resources allocation. The supervision of the principal to the borrower is more encouraging and efficient than that of the commercial bank, and the corrective effect of the entrustment loan on the misallocation of financial resources may increase the cost of the allocation of social resources. Therefore, from the macro point of view, the judicial design of entrusted loans is not the best design in economics. If commercial banks withdraw from the relationship between principal and borrower, direct lending between enterprises can be permitted through market-oriented design. It may raise overall social welfare.
【作者单位】： 河北经贸大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(12BJY016) 河北省科技计划项目(134576209D)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F832.4
[Abstract]:In recent years, the scale of entrusted loans of commercial banks in China has been expanding, which has a significant impact on the relationship between loans and the allocation of social funds. As the intermediary business of commercial banks, entrustment loan lengthens the principal-agent relationship between principal and borrower, increases the allocation cost of social funds, and reduces the efficiency of social resources allocation. The supervision of the principal to the borrower is more encouraging and efficient than that of the commercial bank, and the corrective effect of the entrustment loan on the misallocation of financial resources may increase the cost of the allocation of social resources. Therefore, from the macro point of view, the judicial design of entrusted loans is not the best design in economics. If commercial banks withdraw from the relationship between principal and borrower, direct lending between enterprises can be permitted through market-oriented design. It may raise overall social welfare.
【作者单位】： 河北经贸大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(12BJY016) 河北省科技计划项目(134576209D)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F832.4
【参考文献】
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