匹配理论及其在中国银行信贷市场的应用
发布时间：2019-04-07 16:05
【摘要】：匹配理论作为博弈论的重要分支，理论上主要研究稳定匹配的存在性、存在条件、集合特征以及策略问题。实践上主要结合理论运用到人与组织、人力资源、学生与学校、医生与医院等实际活动中，分析参与主体的匹配决策、匹配过程以及匹配结果。匹配理论在各个实际领域都发挥了重要作用。 目前我国银行信贷市场充斥着信息不对称、道德风险、逆向选择、博弈策略等投机行为问题，也存在资源配置低效问题，具体表现为信贷集中、中小企业贷款难、银行惜贷、流动性过剩以及不良贷款严重。除此之外，市场机制也存在缺陷，主要是信贷激励机制和约束机制不对称、制度管理过度、信贷流程繁杂耗时。本文研究目的是运用匹配理论缓解以上存在问题。 通过对中国银行信贷市场现状的分析，制度变迁、双方的博弈策略选择和目前市场机制的问题和原因进行深入研究调查。根据实际情况，对匹配对象进行细分，并且在各自的效用函数上考虑了风险和利率这两个因素，使得效用函数更加准确，推导出的偏好排序清单更加严谨、得出的匹配结果更加科学。最后，运用递延接受算法，得出中小银行和中小企业可以稳定匹配以及大银行和大企业的可以稳定匹配的结果，并收集大型银行和中小型银行的贷款情况进行实证分析，进一步验证结论。 在分析银行和企业的稳定匹配关系基础上，结合匹配在金融市场运用经验和学者的理论研究基础上，提出信贷匹配体系，能有效解决目前存在问题，信贷匹配体系主要运作步骤是：1、双方向信贷匹配体系提交信息，银行提交目标收益率信息，企业提交愿意承担的最高利率信息。2、银行目标收益率低于企业愿承担最高利率时，该企业为银行的可行集。同理可以构建企业的可行集。3、运用递延接受算法进行匹配，得出稳定的匹配结果。4、企业支付银行利率是银行的目标收益率，，而银行获得的利率是企业愿意承担的最高利率，而两者的差额由机构承担。这样设计是为了激励相容，促使银行和企业在匹配过程中表达真实意愿，有效避免寻租行为、博弈行为，集中资源，提高资源配置效率。而且运作步骤简单，通过信贷匹配体系搭建企业和银行进行中央化匹配过程的桥梁，节省银行重重审批环节，简化贷款流程，节省贷款发放时间。相比之前的匹配结果，能更好更高效的实现资金资源配置。
[Abstract]:As an important branch of game theory, matching theory focuses on the existence, existence conditions, set characteristics and strategy problems of stable matching. In practice, the theory is applied to the actual activities of people and organizations, human resources, students and schools, doctors and hospitals, etc., to analyze the matching decision-making, matching process and matching results of the participants. Matching theory plays an important role in every practical field. At present, the bank credit market in China is full of speculation problems such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, game strategy, etc., and there is also the problem of inefficient resource allocation, which is manifested in the concentration of credit, the difficulty of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises and the reluctance of banks to lend. Excess liquidity and bad loans. In addition, the market mechanism also has the defect, mainly is the credit incentive mechanism and the restraint mechanism asymmetry, the system management is excessive, the credit process is complicated and time-consuming. The purpose of this paper is to use the matching theory to alleviate the above problems. Through the analysis of the present situation of the credit market of the Bank of China, the institutional changes, the choice of the game strategy between the two sides, and the problems and reasons of the present market mechanism are investigated in depth. According to the actual situation, the matching object is subdivided, and the risk and interest rate are considered in each utility function, which makes the utility function more accurate and the preference ranking list deduced more rigorous. The matching results are more scientific. Finally, using the deferred acceptance algorithm, the stable matching results of small and medium-sized banks and small and medium-sized enterprises as well as the stable matching of large banks and large enterprises are obtained, and the loans of large banks and small and medium-sized banks are collected for empirical analysis. Further verify the conclusion. On the basis of analyzing the stable matching relationship between banks and enterprises, combining with the experience of financial market application and the theoretical research of scholars, the credit matching system is put forward, which can effectively solve the existing problems. The main operating steps of the credit matching system are as follows: 1. Both sides submit information to the credit matching system, banks submit target yield information, and enterprises submit information about the highest interest rate they are willing to bear. When the target rate of return of the bank is lower than the highest interest rate the bank is willing to bear, the enterprise is a feasible set for the bank. In the same way, the feasible set of enterprises can be constructed. 3. Using the deferred acceptance algorithm to match, a stable matching result can be obtained. 4, the interest rate paid by the enterprise is the target rate of return of the bank. The interest rate that banks receive is the highest interest rate companies are willing to bear, and the difference between the two is borne by institutions. This design is designed to encourage compatibility, urge banks and enterprises to express their true wishes in the process of matching, effectively avoid rent-seeking behavior, game behavior, concentrate resources, and improve the efficiency of resource allocation. Moreover, the operation steps are simple, through the credit matching system to build a bridge between enterprises and banks for the central matching process, to save banks from a number of approval links, simplify the loan process, save time for lending. Compared with the previous matching results, can achieve better and more efficient allocation of capital resources.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.4
本文编号：2454201
[Abstract]:As an important branch of game theory, matching theory focuses on the existence, existence conditions, set characteristics and strategy problems of stable matching. In practice, the theory is applied to the actual activities of people and organizations, human resources, students and schools, doctors and hospitals, etc., to analyze the matching decision-making, matching process and matching results of the participants. Matching theory plays an important role in every practical field. At present, the bank credit market in China is full of speculation problems such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, game strategy, etc., and there is also the problem of inefficient resource allocation, which is manifested in the concentration of credit, the difficulty of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises and the reluctance of banks to lend. Excess liquidity and bad loans. In addition, the market mechanism also has the defect, mainly is the credit incentive mechanism and the restraint mechanism asymmetry, the system management is excessive, the credit process is complicated and time-consuming. The purpose of this paper is to use the matching theory to alleviate the above problems. Through the analysis of the present situation of the credit market of the Bank of China, the institutional changes, the choice of the game strategy between the two sides, and the problems and reasons of the present market mechanism are investigated in depth. According to the actual situation, the matching object is subdivided, and the risk and interest rate are considered in each utility function, which makes the utility function more accurate and the preference ranking list deduced more rigorous. The matching results are more scientific. Finally, using the deferred acceptance algorithm, the stable matching results of small and medium-sized banks and small and medium-sized enterprises as well as the stable matching of large banks and large enterprises are obtained, and the loans of large banks and small and medium-sized banks are collected for empirical analysis. Further verify the conclusion. On the basis of analyzing the stable matching relationship between banks and enterprises, combining with the experience of financial market application and the theoretical research of scholars, the credit matching system is put forward, which can effectively solve the existing problems. The main operating steps of the credit matching system are as follows: 1. Both sides submit information to the credit matching system, banks submit target yield information, and enterprises submit information about the highest interest rate they are willing to bear. When the target rate of return of the bank is lower than the highest interest rate the bank is willing to bear, the enterprise is a feasible set for the bank. In the same way, the feasible set of enterprises can be constructed. 3. Using the deferred acceptance algorithm to match, a stable matching result can be obtained. 4, the interest rate paid by the enterprise is the target rate of return of the bank. The interest rate that banks receive is the highest interest rate companies are willing to bear, and the difference between the two is borne by institutions. This design is designed to encourage compatibility, urge banks and enterprises to express their true wishes in the process of matching, effectively avoid rent-seeking behavior, game behavior, concentrate resources, and improve the efficiency of resource allocation. Moreover, the operation steps are simple, through the credit matching system to build a bridge between enterprises and banks for the central matching process, to save banks from a number of approval links, simplify the loan process, save time for lending. Compared with the previous matching results, can achieve better and more efficient allocation of capital resources.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.4
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