管理层持股、代理成本对过度投资的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-12 23:05

本文关键词：管理层持股、代理成本对过度投资的影响研究　出处：《重庆理工大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资决策在公司的三大财务决策中扮演着举足轻重的角色,有效的投资关系到企业的经营风险、盈利能力和持续发展。在我国逐年增长的投资背后隐藏着投资效率的问题,现实的投资水平往往偏离了企业最优投资模型,有悖于企业价值最大化目标。由于所有权与经营权两权分离的现代企业特征,引发了信息不对称,导致股东不能对经营者实施有效的监督,未持股的代理人在选择投资项目时会优先选择对自己有利的投资项目,而不是考虑股东利益。当自由现金流充足时,由于建立企业帝国的动机,代理人通过扩大公司规模,控制更多资源,并从中获取更多私人收益,容易引发过度投资。随着管理层持股制度的产生和发展,管理层持股作为一种有效的激励机制近年来被上市公司广泛接纳。但由于我国引进管理层持股激励机制较晚,政策和法律的不完善,一定程度上制约了管理层持股激励机制作用的有效发挥,直到2006年随着股权分置改革的完成,股权激励的管理办法消除了法律障碍,管理层持股才开始得到大规模的运用。直到目前,我国还存在着管理层持股比例普遍较低的问题,因此管理层持股能否达到预期的激励效果有待进一步研究。本文从我国的经济制度和宏观环境出发,以公司治理的角度,首先在委托代理理论框架下分析了代理成本与过度投资的关系,研究发现代理成本越高的上市公司,道德风险越高,过度投资越严重;然后从激励机制的角度研究发现管理层持股能起到使股东与代理人利益趋同的效应,从而抑制过度投资;并进一步分析管理层持股在代理成本对过度投资的正向关系中能起到抑制作用。理论分析之后本文选取了2010—2014年我国深沪两市A股上市公司的原始数据为样本,通过OLS回归模型,探究管理层持股、代理成本对过度投资的影响,并按照是否有管理层持股分样本,以及按产权性质分样本做进一步研究,研究结果表明:(1)过度投资行为在我国上市公司中比较普遍(2)代理成本越高的上市公司,过度投资行为越严重(3)公司存在过度投资行为时,管理层持股表现出激励效应,能够抑制上市公司的过度投资行为(4)管理层持股的激励机制能够抑制代理成本对过度投资的正向作用(5)管理层持股的激励效果在非国有企业中更明显。最后,根据本文的研究结果,结合管理层持股激励机制和过度投资现象,提出优化管理层持股方案的相关政策建议,在一定程度上为上市公司改善激励机制,提升企业的投资效率,优化企业的资源配置提供参考。
[Abstract]:Investment decision-making plays an important role in the company's three major financial decisions, effective investment related to business risk, profitability and sustainable development in China is increasing year by year. Behind the investment to hide the problem of efficiency of investment, real investment levels tend to deviate from the optimal model, contrary to the maximum value of the enterprise the goal of the modern enterprise. The characteristics of separation of ownership and management rights of the two, caused by the information asymmetry, the shareholders can not implement effective supervision to managers, will give priority to their advantage to select investment projects without ownership of the agent in the choice of investment projects, rather than considering the interests of the shareholders. When the free cash flow is sufficient. Since the establishment of a business empire of motivation, the agent through the expansion of company scale, control more resources and to get more private benefits from, easily lead to excessive investment. With the emergence and development of managerial ownership, managerial ownership as an effective incentive mechanism of Listed Companies in recent years has been widely accepted. But because of the introduction of managerial ownership incentive mechanism later, policy and law is not perfect, to a certain extent restricted the effective management equity incentive effect, until in 2006 with the completion of the share reform, equity incentive management measures to eliminate the legal obstacles, the managerial ownership began to be used on a large scale. Until now, our country still exist in the proportion of managerial ownership is generally low. Therefore, managerial ownership can achieve the desired incentive effect needs to be further studied. In this paper I China's economic system and macro environment, from the perspective of corporate governance, first in the framework of principal-agent theory analyzes the relationship between agency cost and excessive investment, research and development The cost of modern science and the higher of the listed companies, the moral risk is high, excessive investment is more serious; then from the incentive mechanism of managerial ownership can play the effect of the interests of shareholders and agents of convergence, to curb excessive investment; and further analysis of the managerial ownership in agency cost on the positive relationship of excessive investment in energy play an inhibitory effect. After theoretical analysis this paper selects the data of 2010 - 2014 in China two cities of Shenzhen and Shanghai A shares of listed companies as samples, through the OLS regression model, explore the managerial ownership, agency cost of over investment, and according to whether there is management to share samples, and according to the property nature of sample further research results show that: (1) excessive investment behavior is common in Chinese listed companies (2) the higher agency cost of listed companies, the excessive investment behavior more serious (3) Company Over investment behavior, managerial ownership showed incentive effect, can inhibit the over investment behavior of listed companies (4) incentive mechanism of managerial ownership can positively inhibitory effect of agency cost on over investment (5) the incentive effect is more obvious in the non state enterprises. Finally, according to the results of this study. That combination of managerial ownership incentive mechanism and excessive investment phenomenon, and puts forward relevant policy suggestions to optimize the management stock ownership plan, improve the incentive mechanism to a certain extent for the listed companies, improve the efficiency of business investment, provide reference for optimal allocation of resources of the company.

【学位授予单位】：重庆理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275

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