基于微分对策的政企合作低碳策略

发布时间：2018-01-20 03:00

本文关键词： 低碳经济政企合作碳排放微分博弈　出处：《系统工程》2016年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：基于区域低碳发展评估构想,建立成本补贴制度下的政企互动动态微分博弈模型,探求激发地方政府与企业热情的符合中国国情低碳发展机制。模型求解表明:地方政府为企业提供一定成本补贴的政企低碳合作制度有助于地区低碳经济发展,对应的Stackelberg主从博弈均衡优于双方单独开展低碳工作的Nash非合作博弈;在相同的地方政府低碳努力轨迹下,政企合作能够推动企业更大程度地投入低碳经营,区域低碳效益得到显著提升。
[Abstract]:Based on the concept of regional low-carbon development evaluation, the dynamic differential game model of government and enterprise interaction is established under the system of cost subsidy. This paper explores the low-carbon development mechanism of local governments and enterprises which is in line with China's national conditions. The solution of the model shows that the local governments provide certain cost subsidies to enterprises in the low carbon cooperation system is conducive to the development of regional low-carbon economy. The corresponding Stackelberg master-slave game equilibrium is better than the non-cooperative Nash game where both sides work alone. In the same local-government low-carbon effort track, government and enterprise cooperation can promote enterprises to invest more in low-carbon operation, and regional low-carbon efficiency has been significantly improved.
【作者单位】：天津大学管理与经济学部;
【分类号】：F124.5;F279.2
【正文快照】： 1引言全球气候变暖被公认为人类社会所面临的一个巨大经济与环境挑战[1]。在世界各国的共同努力下,国际社会达成气候变化领域最具权威的《联合国气候变化框架公约》(UNFCCC)和《京都议定书》(Kyoto Protocol),标志着应对气候问题国际合作基本框架的形成。作为最大的发展中国家

【共引文献】