高管职位特征、机构投资者治理和企业研发投入

发布时间：2018-01-24 08:37

本文关键词： 高管职位特征机构投资者治理产权性质研发投入　出处：《武汉大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国企业对技术的吸收创新能力相对较弱,企业的研发创新问题一直是理论界和实务界探讨的热点主题。企业的研发投入关系到企业的核心竞争力,是我国企业未来获得持续竞争优势的基础。而整个管理层团队作为公司研发投资的核心决策者,其整体的稳定和相互协作构成企业研发的前提条件,企业高管团队的特征对研发活动决策风格有直接影响。落实到团队的背景特征上说,其整体任期特征及任期内薪酬因素是这类影响因素的典型特征,将直接影响高管团队的激励动机,决定其多大程度上支持企业的研发活动。机构投资者在我国公司治理中扮演了越来越重要的角色。在委托代理关系的理论框架下,机构投资者作为股东和作为内部经营者的管理层在面临研发决策时,其风险偏好和时间敏感性是异质的。相较于机构投资者,管理层受到任期合同约束较多,更加关注短期收益,从而引发管理层和机构股东之间的代理冲突。如何有效激励管理层,使其按照与机构股东利益一致的方向进行研发投入,成为值得深入研究的问题。进一步地,本文探讨了当机构投资者能够发挥严格监督治理作用时对高管层的激励问题,高管层如果以确定性任期和薪酬作为参照点,考虑其研发失败的风险预期,则更有可能减弱研发投入,研究此时如何有效激励管理层加大研发投入,更具理论和实践意义。本文首先对相关研究概念进行定义,通过综述前人研究,指出了现有研究的局限,经过理论分析,构建了高管层-机构投资者-企业研发投入的理论框架,提出了相关假设。在实证部分,以沪深A股非金融类上市公司为样本,利用描述性统计和多元回归分析、分企业性质进一步讨论以及稳健性检验等方法,检验了高管职位特征(任期、薪酬)以及机构投资者治理对企业研发投入的影响。实证结果发现:高管职位特征对企业研发投入有显著的正向影响,高管任期越长、货币薪酬越高,企业研发动力越强,研发投入越大;然而在机构投资者有效监督环境下,高管任期越长、短期货币薪酬越高时,出于研发失败风险导致未来职业声誉受损和被替换的考虑,高管会倾向规避风险,反而不利于企业研发。本文的政策意义在于:董事会和股东应当将长短任期和薪酬机制有效结合,完善对高管层的薪酬激励保护机制,审慎做出因研发失败导致业绩下滑时的处罚,解除高管层的"后顾之忧",增强高管加大研发投入的动力。
[Abstract]:The ability of technology absorption and innovation in Chinese enterprises is relatively weak. The research and development innovation of enterprises has been a hot topic in the theoretical and practical circles. The R & D investment of enterprises is related to the core competitiveness of enterprises. As the core decision maker of R & D investment, the whole management team, whose overall stability and cooperation constitute the premise of enterprise R & D, is the foundation of our country's enterprises to obtain the sustainable competitive advantage in the future. The characteristics of the executive team have a direct impact on the decision-making style of R & D activities. In terms of the background characteristics of the team, the overall tenure characteristics and salary factors are the typical characteristics of such factors. Will directly affect the incentive motivation of the executive team. Institutional investors play a more and more important role in the corporate governance of our country. Under the theoretical framework of principal-agent relationship, institutional investors play a more and more important role in determining the extent to which they support the R & D activities of enterprises. The risk preference and time sensitivity of institutional investors as shareholders and internal managers are heterogeneous when they are faced with R & D decisions. Compared with institutional investors, management is more constrained by tenure contracts. Pay more attention to short-term income, thus causing agency conflict between management and institutional shareholders. How to effectively motivate management, according to the interests of institutional shareholders in accordance with the direction of R & D investment. Further, this paper discusses the incentive of senior management when institutional investors can play a role of strict supervision and governance. If the executives take deterministic tenure and salary as reference point and consider the risk expectation of their R & D failure, it is more likely to weaken R & D investment and study how to effectively motivate management to increase R & D investment at this time. First of all, this paper defines the related research concepts, points out the limitations of the existing research, through a review of previous studies, through theoretical analysis. In the empirical part, we take Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares as the sample of non-financial listed companies. Using descriptive statistics and multivariate regression analysis, the paper tests the characteristics of executive positions (tenure) by further discussion of the nature of enterprises and robustness test. The empirical results show that the characteristics of executive positions have a significant positive impact on R & D investment, and the longer the tenure, the higher the monetary compensation. The stronger the enterprise research and development power, the greater the R & D investment; However, in the environment of institutional investors' effective supervision, the longer the tenure of senior executives and the higher the short-term monetary compensation, the higher the risk of failure in R & D will lead to future career reputation damage and replacement considerations, executives will tend to avoid risks. The policy significance of this paper is that the board of directors and shareholders should effectively combine the long and long tenure and compensation mechanism to improve the compensation incentive and protection mechanism for executives. Take care to punish those who fail to do research and development, remove the "worries" of executives, and increase the incentive for executives to invest more in research and development.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.91;F273.1;F275;F271

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