当前位置:主页 > 经济论文 > 企业经济论文 >

关于国有控股上市公司A的股权激励实证研究

发布时间:2018-01-30 23:55

  本文关键词: 国有控股上市公司 股权激励 员工持股计划 股票期权 出处:《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:股权激励起源于美国,随着全球金融市场发展,股权激励在世界众多企业被广泛实施,成为现在的全球化的激励机制。改革开放后,我国企业开始逐步借鉴学习西方公司股权激励的管理办法。随后,中国国有企业也在经营中不断适应市场变化,完成两权分离,深化股份制企业改革,在这一系列的变化中,国有企业也逐渐意识到对高管及核心人员实施股权激励的意义。目前,虽然有些国有企业高管的职位还保持行政职级方面的划分,但他们的行政身份是在渐渐被模糊化的,关注的焦点转而围绕在他们“经理人”的身份和针对与股东委托代理关系之间如何更有效的激励、更有意义的考核等方面。自2005年起,相关监管部门,如证监会、国资委、财政部等出台了一系列相关的意见、工作指引及试行办法等法律法规,为股权激励在上市公司乃至国有控股上市公司的实施做出了制度和体制方便的保障,使股权激励机制得到逐步完善。然而,对于后者来说,由于其特殊的企业性质,在股权激励方案的制定和审批都会来自证监会和国资委的两个方面的审核和监管,相当于在符合国企约束条件的前提下利用市场化的方法来对国有控股上市公司进行股权激励。自2006年以来,国有控股公司正式实施股权激励的案例相比民营公司及普通上市公司,无论从实施的量来看,还是从发展速度来说都相差甚远,股权激励制度的建设还需要继续完善。本篇论文以讨论国有控股上市公司实施股权激励为出发点,通过阐述股权激励的相关概念及理论,对股票期权,虚拟股票,股票增值权,业绩股票,限制性股票,员工持股计划等几种激励中,选取常用的方式进行说明。还会针对我国的现有特殊国情,对我国国有控股上市公司的特征、开展股权激励的意义及股权激励实施现状进行分析。国有控股上市公司主要具备以下几点特征:(1)国有控股公司在股权结构中国有大股东占有相当比重,因此股权结构相对集中(2)不仅要确保国有资产有保值增值,还要起到在国家宏观经济调控中的调节作用(3)在某些方面尚带有原国有企业特征,公司治理方面行政色彩较浓(4)激励及约束机制陈旧,不健全。而对于国有控股上市公司的股权激励的实施现状来说,主要有前提条件之严格、操作限制之繁多等特点。当然,对国有资产管理的谨慎思维是可以理解的,这样是为了避免出现国有资产流失和管理失控等问题。但是在严苛的管理办法下,就无法激起国有企业股权激励的实施积极性以及创新热情,在A股公告股权激励计划的上市公司中,仅有约15%的实施量是国有控股上市公司所开展的,这相较于其在A股上市公司所占的比例很不相称。本文以A公司为例,以实际案例为研究对象,对A公司实施的股权激励方案设计进行阐述,并对最后的实施效果进行分析。论述了国有控股上市公司实施股权激励的障碍,譬如股票市场不成熟,缺乏合理的行权条件设计以及科学的业绩评价体系等,找出存在的种种问题并分析原因。最后,文中结合A公司发展的现状和所有制的特殊性,为其在未来若实施股权激励计划提出切实有效的建议对策,为类似实施股权激励的企业提供参考,完善股权激励的设计思路。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive originated in the United States, with the global financial market development, equity incentive has been widely implemented in many enterprises, now the global incentive mechanism. After the reform and opening up, China's enterprises gradually began to learn western equity incentive management approach. Then, China state-owned enterprises in the business to adapt the change of the market, complete the separation of two rights, deepen the shareholding system reform of enterprises, in this series of changes, the state-owned enterprises have gradually realized the implementation of equity incentive for executives and key personnel significance. At present, although some state-owned enterprise executives positions also maintain division of administrative rank, but their administrative identity is blurred gradually the focus of attention, turn around in their "manager" and the shareholders' identity and on how to effectively stimulate the agent relationship, more meaningful evaluation etc. . since 2005, the relevant regulatory authorities, such as the Commission, the SASAC, the Ministry of Finance issued a series of related ideas, work guidelines and measures and other laws and regulations, and the state-owned listed companies in the implementation of the listed company has made system and security system convenient for equity incentive, to gradually improve the equity incentive mechanism. However, for the latter, due to the special nature of the enterprise, incentive scheme formulation and approval in the equity are two aspects of the audit and supervision from CSRC and SASAC, the equivalent method in accordance with the constraints of the state-owned enterprises under the market of state-owned listed companies equity incentive. Since 2006, the state-owned holding company officially implemented equity incentive cases compared to private companies and listed companies, both from the implementation point of view, or from the development speed Far, the construction of equity incentive system need to be improved. This paper is to discuss the state-owned holding listed company equity incentive as a starting point, through elaborating the related concepts and theories of equity incentive, stock option, virtual stock, stock appreciation rights, the performance of the stock, restricted stock, several employee stock ownership plans incentive, select the commonly used way is explained. Also available according to the specific condition of China, the characteristics of China's state-owned listed companies, to carry out the significance of implementing equity incentive and equity incentive. To analyze the current situation of state-owned holding listed companies mainly have the following characteristics: (1) the state-owned holding company occupies a large shareholders the proportion of equity structure in China, so relatively concentrated ownership structure (2) not only to ensure that the state-owned assets value, but also play a regulatory role in the national macroeconomic regulation and control in (3) In some respects, still with the former state-owned enterprises, corporate governance administrative color is strong (4) incentive and constraint mechanism is not perfect. And the old, the status of implementation for the state-owned listed companies equity incentive, the main premise of strict restrictions, operating various etc.. Of course, careful thinking of the state-owned asset management is understandable, it is in order to avoid the loss of state-owned assets and the management problem. But in the strict management measures, cannot arouse state-owned enterprises implementing equity incentive motivation and enthusiasm for innovation, A shares in equity incentive plan announcement of listed companies, the implementation of the amount is only about 15% the state-owned listed company carried out, which is not commensurate with the proportion of the total compared to A shares in listed companies. This paper takes A company as an example, the actual case as the research object, the implementation of A company shares The right incentive scheme design is expounded, and the implementation of the results of the analysis are discussed. Finally, the state-owned holding listed company equity incentive obstacles, such as the stock market is not mature, lack of reasonable exercise conditions design and scientific performance evaluation system, find out the existing problems and analyzes the reasons. Finally, this paper combined with the status quo of A the development of the company and ownership particularity, put forward the proposal for the effective countermeasures in the future if the implementation of equity incentive plan, provide a reference for the implementation of equity incentive of similar enterprises, improving the equity incentive design.

【学位授予单位】:北京交通大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F272.92;F279.26

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前10条

1 王华兵;李小珍;;股权激励方案设计中存在的问题和对策研究[J];商业会计;2013年03期

2 易欣;;上市公司如何实施股权激励[J];中国乡镇企业会计;2012年01期

3 袁淑文;;关于企业股权激励方式的应用分析[J];中国城市经济;2012年03期

4 毛弄玉;胡淑娟;;我国上市公司股权激励机制存在的问题及建议[J];财会月刊;2009年36期

5 潘亚岚;丁淑洪;;上市公司管理层股权激励与公司业绩相关性研究[J];财会通讯(理财版);2008年05期

6 杨慧辉;;两大股权激励方式激励作用的比较研究——基于厌恶经理人的委托代理模型分析[J];经济经纬;2008年02期

7 祝瑞敏;李长强;;股票期权激励机制及其在我国上市公司的应用[J];上海金融;2007年11期

8 刘永春;赵亮;;上市公司管理层股权激励与公司绩效研究[J];重庆工学院学报(社会科学版);2007年08期

9 辛清泉;林斌;王彦超;;政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J];经济研究;2007年08期

10 何庆明;;股权激励对上市公司的影响及投资策略分析[J];证券市场导报;2007年06期

相关重要报纸文章 前1条

1 张锐;;十大股权激励法[N];中华工商时报;2002年

相关硕士学位论文 前1条

1 吴刚;我国国有上市公司高层管理者薪酬结构与激励机制研究[D];西南大学;2009年



本文编号:1477592

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/xmjj/1477592.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户a1b71***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com