机构投资者对国有上市公司代理成本的影响

发布时间：2018-02-03 22:42

本文关键词： 国企改革代理成本机构投资者市场化进程　出处：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着国企改革的进一步深化,引入混合所有制成为了改善国企公司治理机制的迫切要求,那么本文试图从机构投资者的角度来分析其对国有企业的代理成本是否有影响?其影响又受到哪些因素的促进或者抑制呢?本文以2010到2015年沪深A股的国有上市公司为样本,从机构投资者总体和不同独立性机构投资者的角度分析其对代理成本的影响。并从市场化进程的角度对影响因素进行了研究,经过稳健性检验后研究发现:(1)机构投资者持股总量与代理成本呈负相关,机构投资者持股总量越大,代理成本越低。机构投资者数量与代理成本存在显著正相关关系,即机构投资者数量越多,代理成本越高;(2)独立型机构投资者对国有企业的代理成本有明显的降低作用,非独立型机构投资者对国有企业的代理成本无明显的降低作用;(3)市场化进程能够增强机构投资者尤其是独立型机构投资者对国企代理成本的降低作用。
[Abstract]:With the further deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, the introduction of mixed ownership has become an urgent requirement to improve the corporate governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises. So this paper tries to analyze whether the agency cost of state-owned enterprises has an impact from the perspective of institutional investors. What factors promote or restrain its influence? This paper takes the state-owned listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares as samples from 2010 to 2015. From the perspective of institutional investors as a whole and independent institutional investors, this paper analyzes its impact on agency costs, and studies the influencing factors from the perspective of market-oriented process. After the robustness test, it is found that the total ownership of institutional investors is negatively related to agency cost, and the larger the total ownership of institutional investors is. The lower the agency cost, the higher the agency cost is, the more the number of institutional investors is, the higher the agency cost is. (2) the independent institutional investors have a significant role in reducing the agency cost of state-owned enterprises, while the non-independent institutional investors have no obvious effect on the agency costs of state-owned enterprises; 3) the marketization process can enhance the role of institutional investors, especially independent institutional investors, in reducing agency costs of SOEs.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F276.1

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