管理者反收购策略研究评述和展望

发布时间：2018-02-15 07:25

本文关键词： 反收购策略管理者委托代理理论管家理论　出处：《外国经济与管理》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：随着资本市场收购热潮的兴起,我国敌意收购事件越来越多。作为控制权市场的监督机制,敌意收购能够有效监督管理者的行为,然而管理者基于管理"壕沟效应",倾向于使用不同的反收购策略以保障其职位的稳定性。本文全面回顾了国内外有关反收购策略的研究进展,首先,从委托代理理论、管家理论以及基于资产专用性理论的控制权分配机制分别解释管理者采用反收购策略的动因;其次,从管理者相对权力和制度环境的视角分析了影响管理者采用反收购策略的情境因素;最后,综述了主要反收购策略以及不同反收购策略的经济后果,包括对市场反应、收购结果、管理者行为以及目标公司财务绩效的影响,发现相关研究结论是不一致的。本文认为,未来需要对反收购策略使用的动机、情境条件和经济后果做进一步研究。
[Abstract]:With the rise of capital market takeover boom, hostile takeover events in China are more and more. As the supervisory mechanism of the control market, hostile takeover can effectively supervise the behavior of managers. However, managers tend to use different anti-takeover strategies to ensure the stability of their positions based on the "trench effect" management. This paper reviews the research progress of anti-takeover strategies both at home and abroad. The steward theory and the control allocation mechanism based on asset specificity theory explain the motivation of managers adopting anti-takeover strategy respectively. Secondly, From the perspective of managers' relative power and institutional environment, this paper analyzes the contextual factors that influence managers' adoption of anti-takeover strategies, and finally, summarizes the economic consequences of the main anti-takeover strategies and different anti-takeover strategies, including market reaction. The results of acquisition, manager's behavior and the financial performance of the target company are inconsistent. This paper argues that the motivation, situational conditions and economic consequences of the use of anti-takeover strategies need to be further studied in the future.
【作者单位】：浙江大学管理学院;浙江大学创新技术研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71472168)
【分类号】：F271;F275

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