跨体制社会资本与高管薪酬契约

发布时间：2018-02-23 03:40

本文关键词： 跨体制社会资本薪酬业绩敏感性薪酬黏性民营企业　出处：《经济管理》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文基于中国制度背景,以沪深交易所上市的民营企业为样本,研究高管的跨体制社会资本对其薪酬契约的影响。研究发现,具有跨体制社会资本的高管以及具有的跨体制社会资本在管理团队中越稀缺,其薪酬的绝对水平与相对水平更高。研究同时发现,高管跨体制社会资本的稀缺性与层级性存在替代效应。进一步研究发现,由于组织对跨体制社会资本高管的经营业绩有相对乐观的确定性预期,因此,在薪酬契约中支付了较高的确定性薪酬,而当企业业绩上升时,高管的薪酬并不显著地随着真实业绩的上升而上升,即跨体制社会资本降低了业绩上升时高管的薪酬业绩敏感性。不过,研究发现,这种现象存在于一定的业绩范围内,民营企业高管并没有因此存在薪酬的天花板效应。研究结果也确实发现,具有跨体制社会资本的高管取得了更好的企业业绩。本文研究结论在一定层面上反映了民营企业薪酬的市场化效率,通过薪酬机制与结构的调整实现与高管人力资本的耦合,可以更好地促进组织战略目标的实现。
[Abstract]:Based on the background of Chinese system, this paper takes the private enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a sample to study the influence of the cross-system social capital of executives on their compensation contracts. The more scarce the executives with cross-institutional social capital and the more scarce they are in the management team, the higher the absolute and relative levels of compensation are. Furthermore, it is found that organizations have relatively optimistic deterministic expectations of the management performance of cross-institutional social capital executives. Higher deterministic compensation is paid in the compensation contract, and when corporate performance rises, executive compensation does not rise significantly with the rise in real performance. That is, cross-institutional social capital reduces executive pay performance sensitivity when performance rises. However, the study found that this phenomenon exists in a certain range of performance. Private executives do not therefore have a pay ceiling effect. The results do find that, Executives with cross-system social capital have achieved better corporate performance. The conclusion of this paper reflects the market-oriented efficiency of private enterprises' compensation on a certain level, and coupling with executive human capital through the adjustment of compensation mechanism and structure. Can better promote the realization of the strategic objectives of the organization.
【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学会计学院;厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“政治寻租与企业社会责任:理论、证据及治理”(71502174) 国家社会科学基金重点项目“生态补偿导向的环境会计研究”(14AZD068)
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.5

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