链式多重委托-代理关系的激励——基于完全理性与过程性公平偏好模型的比较

发布时间：2018-02-23 20:20

本文关键词： 过程性公平偏好链式多重委托-代理产出分享激励机制　出处：《中国管理科学》2017年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以传统Holmstrom-Milgrom模型为基础,建立了一个链式多重委托代理结构。以链式双重委托-代理模型为例,本文首先考察了纯委托人、中间人和纯代理人都是完全理性时的情况,通过模型分析发现:在每一层委托-代理关系中,委托人给予代理人的产出分享比例越大,越能激励代理人付出更多的努力,但是代理人的风险规避会减弱这种激励效果。进一步,本文基于Rabin的过程性公平偏好理论,重构考虑过程性公平偏好的链式双重委托-代理模型,研究结果说明:在过程性公平偏好下,如果代理人付出的努力大于其能付出的最大努力水平的一半,那么代理人对委托人就是友善的;同样如果委托人给予代理人的固定收入大于他能给予的最大固定收入的一半,那么委托人对代理人也是友善的;同时,委托人给予的固定收入越多就越能激励代理人付出努力。最后,通过数值模拟对完全理性和过程性公平偏好下各个局中人的收入进行了对比,发现过程性公平偏好的植入使得各局中人的收入得到了帕累托改进。
[Abstract]:In this paper, based on the traditional Holmstrom-Milgrom model, a chain structure of multiple principal-agent is established. Taking the chained double principal-agent model as an example, this paper first investigates the situation of pure principal, middleman and pure agent when they are all completely rational. Through the model analysis, it is found that in each level of principal-agent relationship, the greater the proportion of the principal giving the agent to share the output, the more can motivate the agent to pay more efforts. However, the risk aversion of agents will weaken the incentive effect. Furthermore, based on Rabin's procedural fairness preference theory, this paper reconstructs a chain double principal-agent model considering process fairness preference. The results show that if the agent pays more than half of the best effort he can pay, then the agent is friendly to the principal. Similarly, if the principal gives an agent a fixed income greater than half of the maximum fixed income he can give, the principal is also friendly to the agent; at the same time, The more fixed income the client gives, the more he can motivate the agent to make efforts. Finally, through numerical simulation, we compare the income of people in each bureau under the preference of complete rationality and process fairness. It is found that the implantation of process equity preference has improved the income of people in each bureau.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;重庆交通大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助项目(14XJL004) 重庆市“两江学者”计划专项经费特聘教授资助项目
【分类号】：F274

【相似文献】