考虑服务商风险规避度和垫资能力的研发外包合同设计

发布时间：2018-02-26 05:26

本文关键词： 研发外包风险规避垫资能力收益共享　出处：《研究与发展管理》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：针对研发外包中服务商道德风险防范与激励问题,在考虑服务商风险规避度和垫资能力的情况下,设计了收益共享研发外包合同,分析了服务商风险规避度和垫资能力对固定支付、收益共享系数以及服务商最优研发投入的影响.研究表明,当风险规避度大于阀值时,客户在研发合同设计时不用考虑服务商垫资能力问题,因为服务商不会接受垫资;当风险规避度小于阀值时,研发合同设计中需要进一步考虑服务商垫资能力,特别是当服务商风险规避度特别小的时候,针对不同垫资能力的服务商,随着服务商垫资能力的增加,客户最优的研发外包固定支付先减少,后达到稳定不变,但客户最优的研发外包收益共享系数却是先不变,后增加,最后达到稳定不变.
[Abstract]:Aiming at the problem of moral hazard prevention and incentive of service providers in R & D outsourcing, this paper designs a contract for revenue sharing in R & D outsourcing under the consideration of risk aversion degree and capital cushion ability of service providers. The effects of risk aversion degree and capital cushion ability on fixed payment, income sharing coefficient and optimal R & D investment of service provider are analyzed. The results show that when the risk aversion is greater than the threshold, the risk aversion is greater than the threshold. The customer does not need to consider the service provider's cushion capital ability in the design of the R & D contract, because the service provider will not accept the cushion capital; when the risk aversion is less than the threshold, further consideration should be given to the service provider's cushion capital ability in the design of the R & D contract. Especially when the risk aversion of the service provider is very small, with the increase of the service provider's capital cushion ability, the customer's optimal fixed payment for R & D is reduced first and then stable. But customer's optimal R & D outsourcing revenue sharing coefficient is unchanged first, then increased, and finally stable.
【作者单位】：电子科技大学经济与管理学院;重庆理工大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目“知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制研究”(71301182),“新一代信息技术产业‘联盟组合’与创新能力研究:涌现、构型与治理”(71572028)
【分类号】：F273.1;F274

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