我国上市公司管理层持股对财务风险的影响

发布时间：2018-02-28 05:14

  本文关键词： 管理层持股 财务风险 债务期限结构 利益趋同效应 壕沟效应　出处：《南京大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：管理层持股逐渐成为上市公司的重要现象,但是目前学界对管理层持股的研究,集中在管理层持股对公司价值的研究,较少涉及公司财务风险。本文认为,管理层持股的双重效应(利益趋同效应和壕沟效应)对财务风险产生相反的影响,不同的管理层持股比例会使得占主导地位的效应不同,进而会对财务风险产生不同的影响。本文在梳理了前人管理层持股、债务期限结构、财务风险的相关文献后,选择了财务风险(Z-score)、管理层持股比例(Mbo)、管理层持股比例的平方(Mbo2)、财务杠杆(资产负债率:Lev)、成长性(Tobin' s Q)、盈利性(总资产回报率:Roa)等变量,以2009-2015年度在沪深两地A股上市的非金融公司为研究对象,利用WIND数据库选取了 6244个样本。结合管理层持股的利益趋同效应和壕沟效应理论,运用描述性统计、面板回归和分类研究的方法,研究了管理层持股比例对上市公司财务风险影响的异质性和临界点。本文主要的创新点如下:(1)以往的研究主要将管理层持股仅仅作为变量之一去研究其对债务期限结构和财务风险的影响,本文将其作为核心解释变量并辅以适当的控制变量去研究,能得到更深入的结论;(2)前人的文献未研究管理层持股、债务期限结构和财务风险三者关系。本文依据管理层持股的利益趋同效应和壕沟防守效应理论,以债务期限结构为纽带,分析了管理层持股对财务风险的影响逻辑,揭示了三者的关系;(3)理论上看,根据管理层持股的利益趋同效应和壕沟防守效应,不同的持股比例对财务风险的影响不同。我国近几年管理层持股发生了变化,以往的研究建立在管理层持股比例较低的情况下,所以得出结论为线性关系的较多,而随着管理层持股比例的增加,壕沟防守效应可能增强,管理层持股比例对债务期限结构的影响逐渐复杂,或许存在非线性关系。实证上看,国外文献研究出了非线性关系,国内已有的文献研究出的仍是线性关系。本文通过分类研究,发现我国管理层持股和财务风险的关系是非线性的,这一结论不同于国内已有文献结论;(4)本文分两方面深入研究管理层持股比例与上市公司财务风险的关系。通过参照样本比较持股与不持股的不同;通过持股的五档分类寻找到了管理层持股比例对财务风险影响的异质性和临界点。这些是前人文献中未揭示的。通过理论分析和实证研究,本文得到结论如下:(1)财务风险与管理层持股比例存在U型关系,壕沟效应和利益趋同效应是财务风险与管理层持股比例的U型关系的原因;(2)管理层持股比例至少应达到0.005%才会对财务风险产生影响;(3)在管理层持股的上市公司中,债务期限结构对财务风险存在正影响;(4)在管理层不持股的上市公司中,债务期限结构对财务风险影响不显著;(5)管理层持股比例通过影响债务期限结构的方式影响财务风险。
[Abstract]:Management shareholding has gradually become an important phenomenon of listed companies, but the current academic research on managerial shareholding focuses on the value of the company, less on the financial risk of the company. The dual effect of management shareholding (interest convergence effect and trench effect) has the opposite effect on financial risk. Then it will have different influence on financial risk. After combing the previous literature on management stock ownership, debt maturity structure, financial risk, Variables such as financial risk, management holding ratio, management ownership ratio, management ownership ratio, financial leverage (asset-liability ratio: Levn, growth Tobin's QN, total return on assets: Roa) are selected. Taking non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in 2009-2015 as research objects, 6244 samples were selected by using WIND database. Combined with the benefit convergence effect and trench effect theory of management shareholding, descriptive statistics were used. Panel regression and classification methods, This paper studies the heterogeneity and critical point of the influence of managerial shareholding ratio on the financial risk of listed companies. The main innovation of this paper is as follows: 1) in the past studies, management shareholding is only one of the variables to study its debt period. The effects of structural constraints and financial risks, This paper takes it as the core explanatory variable and studies it with appropriate control variables, and can get a more in-depth conclusion: (2) the previous literature has not studied the management shareholding. The relationship between debt maturity structure and financial risk. Based on the theory of interest convergence effect and trench defense effect, this paper analyzes the logic of the influence of management ownership on financial risk, based on debt maturity structure. In theory, according to the benefit convergence effect and trench defense effect of management shareholding, the influence of different shareholding ratio on financial risk is different. In recent years, management shareholding has changed in China. Previous studies have been based on the low shareholding ratio of the management, so the conclusion is that there are more linear relationships, but with the increase of the management shareholding ratio, the trench defense effect may be enhanced. The influence of managerial shareholding ratio on debt maturity structure is becoming more and more complicated, and there may be nonlinear relationship. In this paper, we find that the relationship between managerial shareholding and financial risk is nonlinear. This conclusion is different from the existing literature in China. This paper studies the relationship between the proportion of managerial shareholding and the financial risk of listed companies from two aspects, and compares the differences between shareholding and non-shareholding by reference samples. The heterogeneity and critical point of the influence of managerial shareholding ratio on financial risk are found through the five-file classification of shareholding. These are not revealed in previous literatures. The conclusion of this paper is as follows: (1) there is a U-type relationship between financial risk and managerial shareholding ratio. Trench effect and benefit convergence effect are the reasons for the U-shaped relationship between financial risk and managerial shareholding ratio. (2) the proportion of managerial shareholding should reach at least 0.005% to have an impact on financial risk. Debt maturity structure has a positive effect on financial risk. (4) in listed companies without ownership by management, debt maturity structure has no significant effect on financial risk. 5) the proportion of management holding shares affects financial risk through the way of affecting debt maturity structure.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F272.91
，

本文编号：1545903