苏泊尔股权激励方案分析

发布时间：2018-03-02 10:09

本文关键词： 股权激励股权性质激励动机激励效果　出处：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股权激励制度是解决代理问题的产物,作为完善公司治理结构的手段,股权激励对提升公司价值和留住关键人才的贡献,为公司发展提供了动力,被国内外上市公司广泛运用。本文以苏泊尔公司由民营家族上市公司转变为外资控股企业前后实施的三套股权激励方案为背景,总结苏泊尔股权激励制度的设计特征,对比公司先后两个阶段股权激励的动机并评价其激励效应,最后结合苏泊尔的案例提出对上市公司设计股权激励制度的启示。本文采用了文献研究法,个案分析法,事件研究法等研究方法,首先,结合公司被收购、高管人才流失频发的背景,纵向对比不同阶段苏泊尔股权激励契约要素的演变特征,发现激励范围不断扩大、契约模式由股票期权转变为限制性股票、行权条件更切合实际且多元化、激励期限延长。接下来,根据契约要素设计特征和以往文献的研究得出结论苏泊尔股权性质变更是股权激励动机差异的根源,外资收购后苏泊尔公司治理水平提升,有效实现两权分离,股权激励措施作用层面扩宽,激励力度加大,相比而言民营家族企业阶段激励动机表现出更强的福利性质,外资控股阶段主要目的为稳定管理团队。之后,梳理历次股权激励实施情况并从市场反应、行权结果和业绩表现多维度衡量评价其激励效果,苏泊尔股权性质变更前的股权激励方案第一个行权期后全部行权,短期内为激励对象带来了高额收益,尽管公司业绩有一定的提振作用,但持续时间较短且市场反应不积极,不排除盈余管理的嫌疑;外资控股后的激励方案授予价格为0元,解锁期的延长使得激励对象分年分批获得薪酬奖励,对稳定公司管理团队有重大贡献,公司净资产收益率等业绩表现发展势头良好,超额累积收益率增长显著。最后,基于制度变迁理论动态均衡理念,建议上市公司在股权激励制度设计前综合考量公司实际情况明确激励动机,设计中以激励动机为导向设置统筹关键契约要素,施行时发挥管理的协同作用,提升公司治理水平并耦合其他管理制度。论文的贡献在于为公司股权性质由民营家族企业转为外资控股公司前后股权激励制度设计和实施的不同表现提供了证据和理论借鉴,案例分析在一定程度上剖析展现了我国现阶段民企被外企收购前后面临的普遍困难和问题,即民背家族企业的公司治理水平的相对薄弱、被外企收购后人才流失现象严重等问题。创新方面,论文最后基于制度变迁理论的动态均衡理念,将公司股权激励看作一个不断变化和均衡的管理过程,提出每一套股权激励方案的制定都需要根据公司所处环境和发展阶段确定契合的激励动机,科学推敲各契约要素设置从而搭建兼具约束性和激励性的契约框架,并发挥公司治理等其他管理制度的协同作用。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive system is the product of solving the agency problem. As a means of perfecting the corporate governance structure, equity incentive contributes to the promotion of corporate value and the retention of key talents, and provides a driving force for the development of the company. It is widely used by listed companies at home and abroad. This paper summarizes the design features of Supor's equity incentive system based on the three sets of equity incentive schemes implemented before and after Supor's transformation from a private family listed company to a foreign-owned holding company. This paper compares the motivation of equity incentive in two stages and evaluates its incentive effect. Finally, combined with the case of Supor, the author puts forward the inspiration to the design of equity incentive system of listed companies. First of all, considering the background of the acquisition of the company and the frequent loss of senior executives, we compare the evolution characteristics of the elements of Supor equity incentive contract in different stages, and find that the scope of incentive is expanding. The contract mode is changed from stock option to restricted stock. The exercise conditions are more practical and diversified, and the incentive period is extended. According to the design characteristics of contract elements and the previous studies, it is concluded that the change of the nature of Supor's equity is the root of the difference of incentive motivation. After the acquisition of foreign capital, the governance level of Supor is improved, and the separation of the two rights is realized effectively. Compared with the incentive motivation of private family enterprises, the incentive motivation in the stage of private family enterprises shows a stronger nature of welfare. The main purpose of the foreign capital holding stage is to stabilize the management team. Combing the past implementation of equity incentive and evaluating its incentive effect from the market reaction, exercise result and performance performance, the stock right incentive scheme before the change of the nature of Supor equity is all exercised after the first exercise period. In the short term, it brings high profit to the incentive target. Although the company's performance has some effect, but the duration is short and the market reaction is not positive, the suspicion of earnings management is not excluded, and the incentive scheme after the foreign capital holding is awarded a price of 0 yuan. The prolongation of the unlocking period makes the incentive object get the salary reward year by year, which has great contribution to stabilizing the company management team. The performance of the company, such as the return on net assets, develops well, and the excess cumulative rate of return increases significantly. Based on the dynamic equilibrium concept of institutional change theory, it is suggested that listed companies should consider the actual situation of the company comprehensively before the design of the equity incentive system, and set up the key contract elements in the design guided by incentive motivation. Exert the synergistic effect of management at the time of implementation, The contribution of this paper is to provide evidence and theoretical reference for the design and implementation of the equity incentive system before and after the ownership nature of the private family enterprise is transformed into a foreign-owned holding company. To a certain extent, the case analysis shows the common difficulties and problems faced by private enterprises before and after they were acquired by foreign companies, that is, the relative weakness of the corporate governance level of the Minbei family enterprises. In the aspect of innovation, the paper regards corporate equity incentive as a changing and balanced management process based on the dynamic equilibrium concept of institutional change theory. It is proposed that the formulation of each set of equity incentive schemes needs to determine the appropriate incentive motivation according to the company's environment and development stage, and scientifically examine the setting of each contract element so as to build a binding and encouraging contractual framework. And give play to the synergy of other management systems such as corporate governance.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F426.6

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