竞争战略对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-09 02:11

本文选题：竞争战略　切入点：低成本战略　出处：《湖南大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：根据最优契约理论与激励理论,高管薪酬应当与公司业绩紧密相联。理论界对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的变化特征与成因,展开了深入、广泛的研究,取得了颇丰的研究成果,然而从经营战略角度对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的研究却较匮乏。随着市场化竞争的加剧,竞争战略对一个企业的生存与发展至关重要,高管在战略的制定与实施中举足轻重,如何引导高管的行为,薪酬是关键因素之一。高管薪酬应当与竞争战略相匹配,促使高管为竞争战略目标的实现而努力奋斗。我国的国有企业和民营企业有着产权属性的根本不同,区分不同产权性质,研究竞争战略对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,能够得到更科学、合理的结论。因此,本文以2009至2014年沪深A股制造业上市公司的数据为样本,区分民营与国有两种不同的产权性质,研究公司竞争战略对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。结果发现,对国企而言,差异化战略相比于成本领先战略,显著降低了高管薪酬会计业绩敏感性和高管薪酬市场业绩敏感性。而对民企而言,差异化竞争相比于成本领先战略,显著提高了高管薪酬市场业绩敏感性,而对高管薪酬会计业绩敏感性没有显著影响。实证结果证实了竞争战略是影响高管薪酬业绩敏感性的一个重要因素,从激励角度来看,民营企业实现了高管薪酬政策与竞争战略的有效匹配,而国有企业则由于复杂的原因未能实现二者的有效匹配,为此,提出国企高管薪酬绩效评价综合化、国企高管选拔机制市场化、国有企业治理结构有效化的改进建议。
[Abstract]:According to the optimal contract theory and incentive theory, executive compensation should be closely related to corporate performance. However, the research on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance from the perspective of management strategy is relatively scarce. With the intensification of market-oriented competition, competitive strategy is very important to the survival and development of an enterprise, and the senior executive plays an important role in the formulation and implementation of the strategy. Compensation is one of the key factors in how to guide executive behavior. Executive pay should match competitive strategies. The state-owned enterprise and the private enterprise have the fundamental difference of the property right attribute, distinguish the different property right nature, study the influence of the competitive strategy to the executive salary performance sensitivity. Therefore, taking the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2009 to 2014 as a sample, we can distinguish between private enterprises and countries with two different properties of property rights. This paper studies the effect of competitive strategy on executive compensation performance sensitivity. The results show that, for state-owned enterprises, differentiation strategy is more important than cost leading strategy. It significantly reduces the sensitivity of executive compensation accounting performance and executive compensation market performance. For private enterprises, compared with the cost leading strategy, differentiated competition significantly improves the performance sensitivity of executive compensation market. The empirical results confirm that competitive strategy is an important factor affecting executive compensation performance sensitivity. Private enterprises have realized the effective matching between executive compensation policy and competitive strategy, while state-owned enterprises have failed to achieve the effective matching for complicated reasons. Therefore, the paper puts forward the integration of executive compensation performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises. The state-owned enterprise executive selection mechanism marketization, the state-owned enterprise governance structure effective improvement suggestion.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F271;F272.92

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