内部控制对国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响研究——基于国有企业分类改制的背景

发布时间：2018-03-10 23:29

本文选题：高管薪酬　切入点：业绩敏感性　出处：《华东经济管理》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在国有企业分类改制的背景下,文章以2009-2015年上市国有企业为样本研究内部控制质量对国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,并按公益类和商业类国有企业进行分组研究,结果表明:内部控制质量的提高对公益类国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性影响不显著;对商业类国有企业进行细分后发现,内部控制质量的提高对竞争型和行政垄断型国有企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性影响显著增强,而对自然垄断型国有企业的影响不显著。由此可见,内部控制的实施在不同类型国有企业中影响不同,内部控制并不是提高全类型国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性的良药,国有企业分类改革必须对症下药。
[Abstract]:Under the background of state-owned enterprise classification reform, this paper studies the influence of internal control quality on the performance sensitivity of state-owned enterprise executives from 2009-2015, and carries out a group study according to public and commercial state-owned enterprises. The results show that the improvement of internal control quality has no significant effect on the performance sensitivity of executives in public interest state-owned enterprises. The improvement of internal control quality has a significant effect on executive compensation performance sensitivity of competitive and administrative monopoly state-owned enterprises, but not on natural monopoly state-owned enterprises. The implementation of internal control has different effects on different types of state-owned enterprises. Internal control is not a good medicine to improve the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in all types of state-owned enterprises. The classification reform of state-owned enterprises must be appropriate to the case.
【作者单位】：合肥工业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金一般项目(15BJY008) 教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(16YJC790029) 合肥工业大学博士专项科研基金项目(JZ2014HGXJ0043);合肥工业大学横向项目(W2014JSKF0036;W2014JSKF0489;W2015JSKF0169)
【分类号】：F276.1;F272.92

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