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动态惩罚机制下企业环境遵从行为演化动态分析

发布时间:2018-03-13 15:11

  本文选题:动态惩罚 切入点:演化博弈 出处:《系统管理学报》2017年06期  论文类型:期刊论文


【摘要】:为应对日趋凸显的环境污染问题,运动式执法已成为我国现阶段区域环境治理中频繁使用的治理工具。就规制实践而言,企业环境行为选择愈发显著的受到动态惩罚机制的刺激与激励;但在理论层面,该问题并未得到足够的关注。运用演化博弈理论深入探讨了动态监管机制下的企业环境遵从行为演化动态及其规制策略设计问题,以期为相关决策制定提供理论依据与政策建议。研究结果表明:在政府监管能力存在明显约束的条件下,精心设计的动态惩罚机制能够成为实现区域内企业环境遵从行为良好诱导与控制的有力工具;并且,相比模糊型动态惩罚机制,明确型动态惩罚机制能够取得更好的规制效果。然而,研究进一步发现,就我国现阶段国情而言,政府仍需将"如何走出‘两高一低’的困局"作为环境治理改革的关键性任务;同时,也需注重由运动式环境执法向常态式环境执法的转变。
[Abstract]:In order to deal with the increasingly prominent problem of environmental pollution, sports law enforcement has become a frequently used governance tool in regional environmental governance in China at the present stage. The choice of enterprise environmental behavior is more and more obviously stimulated and encouraged by the dynamic punishment mechanism, but at the theoretical level, This problem has not been paid enough attention to. The evolutionary game theory is used to discuss the evolution dynamics of corporate environmental compliance behavior and the design of regulatory strategies under the dynamic supervision mechanism. In order to provide theoretical basis and policy advice for relevant decision-making, the research results show that: under the condition that the government's regulatory capacity is obviously restricted, The well-designed dynamic punishment mechanism can be a powerful tool to induce and control the corporate environmental compliance behavior in the region, and compared with the fuzzy dynamic punishment mechanism, The explicit dynamic punishment mechanism can achieve better regulatory effect. However, the study further finds that, as far as the current situation of our country is concerned, The government still needs to take "how to get out of the dilemma of" two high and one low "as the key task of environmental governance reform, and at the same time, it should pay attention to the transformation from the sports environmental law enforcement to the normal environmental law enforcement.
【作者单位】: 江苏大学管理学院;南京大学社会科学计算实验中心;
【基金】:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71201071,71471076,71471077) 教育部人文社科研究规划基金资助项目(17YJAZH035) 江苏省“六大人才高峰”高层次人才培养项目(JNHB-018)
【分类号】:F224.32;F279.2;X322


本文编号:1606929

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