高管集权、内控质量与会计稳健性

发布时间：2018-03-23 00:16

本文选题：高管集权　切入点：内控质量　出处：《山西财经大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：21世纪初美国发生一系列财务舞弊案件,这促使美国政府强化了内部控制信息披露机制。内部控制能实现企业内部的自我调节和自我制约,企业通过建立完善并能得到有效执行的内部控制体系,能为利益相关者提供真实可靠的财务信息。而稳健性作为财务信息确认的必要标准,可以有效解决由于数据不准确而产生的代理冲突问题。高质量的内部控制下,企业对外报出真实可靠的财务信息,从而可以提高会计稳健性。借鉴美国的经验,我国的企业也应如此,况且我国自古以来崇尚权力,企业高管的个人特质及拥有的权力会影响企业的经营决策和内部控制执行效果。因此,当内部控制增强企业会计稳健性的时候,高管集权会影响这种增强作用。本文搜集沪市和深市2012-2014年主板公司的财务数据,利用迪博内控指数来判断内控质量的高低,通过Basu提出的盈余股票报酬模型衡量会计稳健性,选择公司规模、财务风险、成长能力作为控制变量,首先探究稳健性特征是否为会计盈余的保障和基础,接着检验内控质量对会计稳健性的增强作用,最后用董事长与CEO是否两职合一来定义高管集权,以分析高管集权对内部控制与会计稳健性关系的影响。经过实证研究,本文发现:(1)在研究样本中,80.50%的上市公司内控指数较高,然而少数公司内控质量处于较低水平。(2)稳健性特征是会计盈余的保障和基础。(3)高质量的内部控制增强了会计稳健性表现。(4)高管集权会削弱内部控制对会计稳健性的增强作用,而在高管非集权状态下,内控质量对会计稳健性的增强作用能得到有效发挥。本文系统研究了企业高管集权、内控质量和会计稳健性的关系,在理论价值上,相比于其他学者的研究,本文添加高管权力配置结构变量,为配置公司权力结构及制定政策提供参考;在实践价值上,从会计信息质量的角度证实了规范内部控制信息披露的必要性,有助于真正发挥公司内部治理机制的监督作用,以保证财务信息的可靠性。
[Abstract]:At the beginning of the 21st century, a series of financial fraud cases occurred in the United States, which prompted the United States government to strengthen the information disclosure mechanism of internal control, which can realize self-regulation and self-restraint within enterprises. By establishing a perfect internal control system that can be implemented effectively, the enterprise can provide real and reliable financial information for the stakeholders, and soundness is the necessary standard for the recognition of financial information. It can effectively solve the problem of agency conflict caused by inaccurate data. Under high quality internal control, enterprises can report true and reliable financial information to the outside world, thus improving accounting conservatism. Chinese enterprises should do the same. Moreover, our country has advocated power since ancient times. The personal characteristics and power of executives will affect the effect of business decisions and internal control. When the internal control enhances the accounting conservatism of the enterprise, the centralization of executive power will affect the enhancement. This paper collects the financial data of the main board companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for 2012-2014, and uses the Depot internal control index to judge the quality of the internal control. Through the earnings stock reward model proposed by Basu to measure accounting conservatism, select company size, financial risk, growth ability as control variables, first explore whether conservatism is the guarantee and basis of accounting earnings. Then it tests the enhancement effect of internal control quality on accounting conservatism, and finally defines the influence of executive centralization on the relationship between internal control and accounting conservatism by using the combination of chairman and CEO to analyze the influence of executive centralization on the relationship between internal control and accounting conservatism. In this paper, we find that 80.50% of the listed companies in the study sample have a higher internal control index. However, a few companies' internal control quality is at a lower level) conservatism is the guarantee and basis of accounting earnings. (3) High quality internal control enhances the performance of accounting conservatism. 4) the centralization of executive power will weaken the enhancement effect of internal control on accounting conservatism. Under the condition of executive non-centralization, the enhancement of internal control quality to accounting conservatism can be effectively brought into play. This paper systematically studies the relationship between executive centralization, internal control quality and accounting conservatism. Compared with the research of other scholars, this paper adds the structural variables of executive power allocation to provide a reference for the allocation of corporate power structure and the formulation of policies. It proves the necessity of standardizing the disclosure of internal control information from the angle of the quality of accounting information, which is helpful to give full play to the supervisory role of the internal governance mechanism of the company and to ensure the reliability of the financial information.
【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275

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