上市公司控制权配置效率的比较分析——基于帕累托标准、希克斯标准与利益相关者标准

发布时间：2018-03-25 15:39

本文选题：控制权配置　切入点：效率评价　出处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2017年01期

【摘要】：资本市场的并购行为导致公司控制权的重新配置,而基于不同治理结构与契约关系的控制权配置会产生不同的效率。控制权配置的效率评价具有不同的选择标准,传统的帕累托标准和希克斯标准仅仅考虑到股东的利益变化,而利益相关者标准则扩展了利益变动的主体范围。虽然不同的效率标准与股东至上逻辑具有相容性,同时在一定的条件下可以相互转化,但由于利益相关者标准依据的是社会福利观,并且与之对应的是一种更为有效的公司治理结构,因而是最优的效率选择。
[Abstract]:Mergers and acquisitions in capital market lead to the reconfiguration of corporate control rights, while the allocation of control rights based on different governance structures and contractual relationships will result in different efficiency. The efficiency evaluation of control allocation has different selection criteria. The traditional Pareto criterion and Hicks criterion only take into account the change of shareholders' interests, while the stakeholder criterion expands the scope of the main body of interest change, although different efficiency standards are compatible with the shareholder supremacy logic. At the same time, they can transform each other under certain conditions, but because the stakeholder standard is based on the concept of social welfare, and corresponding to a more effective corporate governance structure, it is the best choice of efficiency.
【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“股权分置改革背景下企业投票权规则、控制权配置与效率选择”(07BFX048)
【分类号】：F271

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