高管晋升激励与并购支付决策

发布时间：2018-03-28 09:35

  本文选题：高管晋升激励　切入点：并购支付方式　出处：《软科学》2017年12期

【摘要】：基于代理理论的研究框架,研究了高管晋升激励与并购支付决策的关系及其边界条件。研究发现:高管晋升激励能够显著提高并购支付决策的风险承担水平,表现为更有可能选择风险较高的现金支付,而不是相对谨慎的股权支付;高管任期和产权性质能够负面调节高管晋升激励与现金支付之间的正向关系。
[Abstract]:Based on the framework of agency theory, this paper studies the relationship between executive promotion incentive and M & A payment decision and its boundary conditions, and finds that executive promotion incentive can significantly improve the risk-bearing level of M & A payment decision. They are more likely to opt for riskier cash payments than relatively cautious equity payments, and tenure and property rights can negatively regulate the positive relationship between executive promotion incentives and cash payments.
【作者单位】： 南京大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71572075、71272108)
【分类号】：F272.92
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本文编号：1675759