企业纵向边界与企业治理对代理成本的影响

发布时间：2018-03-31 19:07

本文选题：企业纵向边界　切入点：企业治理　出处：《湖南大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：关于企业纵向边界如何确定,学术界有新古典经济理论、交易成本理论、企业能力理论等进行过相关研究。这些理论虽然能够在一定程度上解释企业纵向边界的确定,但更适用于所有权与控制权合一的古典企业中。由于现代企业的所有权与控制权分离,因此企业纵向边界的确定会受到代理人主观偏好的影响。因为企业通过纵向一体化战略,扩大纵向边界后,代理人面临的市场竞争压力减小,代理人与所有者的信息不对称会进一步加剧,同时代理人也拥有更大的控制权。既然企业纵向边界的扩大会带来以上三方面的变化,那么在纵向边界大的企业中,代理问题是否更加突出?企业实施纵向一体化战略后随之而来的代理问题,能否通过内部治理机制进行缓解?本文以企业纵向边界扩大所带来的影响为切入点,通过理论分析、数学模型推导以及实证检验,结果表明：企业纵向边界越大,代理问题越严重,企业的代理成本也越大。当将样本按照代理人是否持股分为两组,进一步研究发现在代理人持股的公司中,出现了相反的结论。由于代理人持有股份而与企业利益更加协调一致,所以纵向边界的扩张反而可以带来代理成本的相对节约。不同的企业治理要素在缓解代理问题上所起的作用差异较大,部分企业治理要素能够降低代理成本,而其他治理要素则不能。本文还将单个企业治理要素进行主成分分析后得到一个综合指标来衡量企业的治理水平。将该综合指标纳入回归模型进行分析后,发现在综合治理水平高的企业中,纵向边界对代理成本的影响会受到削弱。根据研究结论,本文提出了谨慎实施纵向一体化战略、建设职业经理人市场、加强企业制度建设等建议,为缓解代理问题、降低代理成本提供参考。
[Abstract]:As to how to determine the vertical boundary of the enterprise, the academic circle has carried on the related research such as the neoclassical economic theory, the transaction cost theory, the enterprise ability theory and so on. These theories can explain the determination of the vertical boundary of the enterprise to a certain extent. However, it is more suitable for classical enterprises where ownership and control are United. Because of the separation of ownership and control in modern enterprises, the determination of vertical boundaries will be influenced by the subjective preference of agents. After enlarging the vertical boundary, the market competition pressure of the agent is reduced, and the information asymmetry between the agent and the owner will be further aggravated. At the same time, agents also have greater control. Since the expansion of vertical boundaries of enterprises will bring about the changes of the above three aspects, is the agency problem more prominent in enterprises with large vertical boundaries? After the implementation of vertical integration strategy, can the agency problem be alleviated through the internal governance mechanism? This paper takes the influence of the expansion of the vertical boundary of the enterprise as the starting point, through theoretical analysis, mathematical model derivation and empirical test, the results show that the bigger the vertical boundary, the more serious the agency problem is. When the sample is divided into two groups according to whether the agent holds shares, further study shows that in the company that the agent holds the shares, A contrary conclusion emerged. Because the agent held shares, the interests of the enterprise were more aligned, Therefore, the expansion of vertical boundary can bring about relative savings of agency cost. Different factors of corporate governance play a different role in alleviating agency problems, and some elements of corporate governance can reduce agency costs. However, the other governance elements can not. This paper also gets a comprehensive index to measure the governance level of the enterprise after the single corporate governance element is analyzed by principal component analysis, and the comprehensive index is incorporated into the regression model to analyze the governance level of the enterprise. It is found that the influence of vertical boundary on agency cost will be weakened in the enterprises with high level of comprehensive management. According to the conclusion of the research, this paper puts forward the strategy of implementing the vertical integration carefully and constructing the professional manager market. Strengthen the construction of enterprise system and provide reference for alleviating agency problem and reducing agency cost.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F271;F275

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