中国上市公司高管激励与内部控制有效性关系的研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 17:35

本文选题：内部控制有效性　切入点：物质激励　出处：《西北大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：企业的内部控制体系是资本市场上会计信息可靠性的基础,为上市公司健康运行提供基本的保障。近些年来,企业内部控制失败的案例层出不穷,严重影响了投资者们对企业财务报告可靠性的信心。上市公司高管作为内部控制的设计和运行主体,必须对其有效性负责。基于委托代理理论,为了解决管理者与股东之间的冲突、降低代理成本、减少道德风险,企业必须通过激励机制引导管理者积极制定并执行有效的内部控制制度。本文选取2012年一2015年间沪深两市上市的所有A股上市公司作为研究样本,根据产权结构的不同,分别在国有企业和民营企业当中,针对高管的激励机制(包括物质激励和政治激励)与内部控制有效性的关系,结合实证结果与相关理论分析,为企业如何提高内部控制有效性水平与完善激励机制提出相关的政策建议。本文的主要结论是:(1)激励机制针对不同的产权结构有不同的影响效果,民营企业对高管的薪酬激励和股权激励都能够显著的提高企业内部控制有效性的水平,而在国有企业中对总经理的薪酬激励可以提高企业内部控制有效性,但股权激励效果不大,反之对董事长来说,股权激励的作用比薪酬激励更显著;政治激励并不能提高内部控制有效性,反而会削弱物质激励在提高内部控制有效性时对高管的影响;(2)在国有企业中,内部控制有效性的提高对总经理获得薪酬回报有积极效应,但是对总经理获得股权份额和是否取得晋升却没有显著的影响,高管晋升的主要影响因素是政治背景;(3)在民营企业中高管拥有政治背景能够带来较好的融资便利。
[Abstract]:The internal control system of enterprises is the basis of the reliability of accounting information in the capital market and provides the basic guarantee for the healthy operation of listed companies.In recent years, the failure of enterprise internal control cases emerge in endlessly, which seriously affects the confidence of investors in the reliability of corporate financial reports.As the main body of design and operation of internal control, listed company executives must be responsible for its effectiveness.Based on the principal-agent theory, in order to solve the conflict between managers and shareholders, reduce agency costs and reduce moral hazard, enterprises must guide managers to actively formulate and implement effective internal control system through incentive mechanism.This paper selects all A-share listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2012 to 2015 as research samples. According to the different property structure, they are among state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, respectively.According to the relationship between the incentive mechanism of senior executives (including material incentive and political incentive) and the effectiveness of internal control, the empirical results and relevant theories are analyzed.Some policy suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of internal control and improve the incentive mechanism are put forward.The main conclusion of this paper is that the incentive mechanism has different effects on different property structure. The compensation incentive and equity incentive of private enterprises can significantly improve the level of the effectiveness of internal control.In state-owned enterprises, the compensation incentive to the general manager can improve the effectiveness of internal control, but the effect of equity incentive is not so good. On the contrary, the role of equity incentive is more significant than salary incentive to the chairman.Political incentives can not improve the effectiveness of internal control, on the contrary, it will weaken the influence of material incentives on executives when improving the effectiveness of internal control. In state-owned enterprises, the improvement of internal control effectiveness has a positive effect on the general manager's compensation return.However, there is no significant influence on the general manager's share share and promotion. The main influencing factor of executive promotion is the political background. (3) having political background in private enterprises can bring better financing facilities.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F272.92

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