康达尔反并购京基的案例分析

发布时间：2018-04-08 16:57

本文选题：敌意并购　切入点：反并购策略　出处：《深圳大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：企业并购是成熟资本市场的必然产物,但资本市场上所发生的并购活动并不完全都是双方自愿的。近两年来A股市场涌现出越来越多的敌意并购案,股权争夺也越演越烈。本文以康达尔反并购京基的案例为研究对象,对并购双方背景、并购动机、反并购策略等做了相对详尽地分析。研究的内容主要包括:(一)绪论部分,主要阐述本文的研究背景、文献综述、内容和方法等;(二)案例分析部分,主要包括并购过程出现的新问题和针对并购问题的分析;(三)建议总结部分,主要针对此案例进行深层次思考,分析企业反并购过程中的策略应用以及该案例给我们带来的启示,并提出相应建议。同股同权的A股市场上,股东对上市公司的控制效力主要体现在持股比例上。容易遭受并购威胁的上市公司,一般其股权都是相对分散的。但是本文案例却打破了这种经验的认知——康达尔原第一大股东华超投资控股集团自身的持股比例实际达到了26.87%,在其意识到危险后又通过二级市场增持至29.85%,但依然没有保住对康达尔的控制权。目前京基集团反超华超集团成为康达尔第一大股东,持股比例31.65%。当前双方持股比例差距较小,陷入并购与反并购的拉锯战,在股东大会形成僵持局面。当康达尔反并购京基这样的案例出现,意味着即便是掌控接近30%的股权,也并未对公司的决策控制权形成足够的保护,这给A股相关上市公司敲响了警钟,也引出了本文研究的问题,康达尔为何会在具有相对控股优势的情况下反并购失败,如何在拥有足够持股比例的情况下抵御其他公司的敌意并购。针对当前背景,2016年数十家A股上市公司相继提出修改公司章程的议案,试图事前采取设置反并购条款的策略,来捍卫自身对公司的控制权。然而在目前的法律环境和市场条件下,这些反并购条款均与现行法律法规中的既有条款产生了或多或少的冲突,在实践中收效甚微。针对京基与自然人共同行动,获得多方股权,直接控股康达尔的敌意并购方式,同时结合我国“同股同权”的市场背景,本文认为委托表决权的使用或许是距离解决问题最近的途径。
[Abstract]:M & A is the inevitable outcome of the mature capital market, but the M & A activities in the capital market are not entirely voluntary.In recent two years, A-share market has emerged more and more hostile mergers and acquisitions, equity competition is also becoming more and more intense.This paper takes the case of Kangdar's anti-M & A as the research object, and makes a relatively detailed analysis on the background, motive and anti-merger strategy of both sides of M & A.The content of the research mainly includes the introduction part of the first part of the thesis, which mainly expounds the research background, literature review, content and method of this paper, etc. (2) the case analysis part.It mainly includes the new problems in the process of M & A and the analysis of the M & A problems. (3) the conclusion of the suggestions, which mainly focuses on the deep thinking of this case.This paper analyzes the strategy application in the process of enterprise anti-merger and the enlightenment brought to us by this case, and puts forward some corresponding suggestions.In the A-share market with same shares and rights, the controlling effect of shareholders over listed companies is mainly reflected in the shareholding ratio.The listed companies that are vulnerable to the threat of M & A generally have relatively dispersed equity.However, the case of this paper breaks the cognition of this kind of experience. The proportion of shares held by the former largest shareholder, Huachao Investment holding Group, has actually reached 26.87%, and after realizing the danger, it has increased its holdings to 29.85% through the secondary market, but according to the previous situation, the proportion of shares held by Huachao Investment holding Group has reached 26.87%.Yet control of Condal has not been preserved.At present, the Beijing-based group overtook the Huachao Group to become the largest shareholder of Condal, with a shareholding ratio of 31.65.At present, the gap between the two sides' shareholding ratio is relatively small, and they fall into a tug-of-war between M & A and anti-M & A, forming a stalemate in the shareholders' general meeting.When cases such as Kangdar's anti-takeover of Kyingchi emerged, it meant that even controlling nearly 30% of the shares did not provide sufficient protection for the decision-making control of the company, which sounded a wake-up call for A-share related listed companies.It also leads to the question of why Condal would fail in the case of relative holding advantage and how to resist hostile mergers and acquisitions of other companies under the condition of having sufficient shareholding ratio.In view of the current situation, dozens of A-share listed companies have proposed amendments to their articles of association in 2016, in an attempt to defend their control of the company by adopting the anti-merger clause in advance.However, in the current legal environment and market conditions, these anti-M & A provisions have more or less conflicts with the existing provisions in the current laws and regulations, and have little effect in practice.In view of the hostile M & A mode in which Jingji and natural person act together to obtain multi-ownership and directly control Condal, and at the same time combining with the market background of "same share and same right" in our country,This paper holds that the use of entrustment voting rights may be the closest way to solve the problem.
【学位授予单位】：深圳大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F324

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