考虑长短期努力的过度自信代理人激励机制

发布时间：2018-04-12 09:47

本文选题：代理人 + 激励机制　；参考：《运筹与管理》2017年08期

【摘要】：以相对净收益为标准设计代理人薪酬契约,同时考虑代理人过度自信及长短期努力水平,并区分长短期努力的冲突性与非冲突性,分别建立非货币效用计量模型和代理人最优激励模型,探索各项因素对代理人努力水平及业绩分享比例的影响。研究发现如下几点主要结论:第一,垄断行业代理人努力水平远远低于竞争性行业,且行业垄断程度越高,代理人努力水平越低。第二,行业垄断盈余比例与业绩分享比例之间的关系受委托人与代理人过度自信程度影响,当代理人过度自信系数高于委托人时,行业垄断程度越高,业绩分享比例越大,反之结论相反。第三,代理人对有利状态过度自信程度越高,对不利状态过度自信程度越低,代理人努力水平与业绩分享比例越高;委托人对有利状态过度自信程度越高,对不利状态过度自信程度越低,代理人努力水平与业绩分享比例越低。第四,代理人努力水平与边际非货币收益正相关,与边际非货币成本呈负向变化关系。
[Abstract]:Based on the relative net income, the agent compensation contract is designed, taking into account the overconfidence of the agent and the level of long-term and short-term effort, and differentiating the conflict between the long-term and short-term efforts, and the non-conflict between the long-term and short-term efforts.The non-monetary utility measurement model and the agent optimal incentive model are established to explore the influence of various factors on the agent's effort level and the proportion of performance sharing.The main conclusions are as follows: first, the level of agency effort in monopoly industry is much lower than that in competitive industry, and the higher the degree of monopoly is, the lower the level of agency effort is.Secondly, the relationship between the proportion of the industry monopoly surplus and the proportion of achievement sharing is affected by the degree of overconfidence between the principal and the agent. When the coefficient of overconfidence of the agent is higher than that of the principal, the higher the degree of industry monopoly, the greater the proportion of performance sharing.Conversely, the conclusion is opposite.Third, the higher the degree of overconfidence in the favorable state, the lower the degree of overconfidence in the adverse state, the higher the ratio of the agent's effort level to the performance sharing, the higher the degree of overconfidence of the client is to the favorable state.The lower the degree of overconfidence in adverse state, the lower the ratio of agent effort level to performance sharing.Fourth, the level of agency effort is positively related to marginal non-monetary income and negatively related to marginal non-monetary cost.
【作者单位】：东北大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71271048,71202154) 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(博导类)项目(20130042110032) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(规划基金项目16YJA630048) 国家社会科学基金项目(17BGL244)
【分类号】：F272.92

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