最优碳税税率对供应链结构和社会福利的影响

发布时间：2018-04-14 05:42

本文选题：供应链管理 + 三阶段Stackelberg博弈　；参考：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年04期

【摘要】：论文构建基于政府、制造商和零售商的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,比较研究零售市场在垄断和竞争两种情形下,博弈参与方各自的最优决策,碳税在市场参与者间的转嫁和重新分配,以及消费者环保意识和二氧化碳价格等因素对均衡决策和社会福利的影响.研究结果表明,垄断和竞争两种情形下,最优碳税税率均随消费者环保意识的增大而增大;当消费者环保意识或碳价格较高时,政府对制造商按最优税率征收碳税可以有效提高社会福利;即使消费者环保意识或二氧化碳价格较低,政府对高碳排放量制造商征收碳税也是尤为必要的;当最优碳税税率值难以计算时,直观税率值可以作为政府制定碳税税率时的一个次优选择;且零售市场的竞争强度越大时,直观税率越接近最优税率.
[Abstract]:In this paper, a three-stage Stackelberg game model based on government, manufacturer and retailer is constructed to compare and study the optimal decision of game participants and the transfer and redistribution of carbon tax among market participants in the two situations of monopoly and competition in retail market.As well as consumer environmental awareness and carbon dioxide price and other factors on balanced decision-making and social welfare.The results show that the optimal carbon tax rate increases with the increase of consumers' awareness of environmental protection in both monopolistic and competitive situations, and when consumers' awareness of environmental protection or the price of carbon is high,Government carbon tax on manufacturers at the optimal rate can effectively improve social welfare, even if consumers' awareness of environmental protection or the price of carbon dioxide is low, it is particularly necessary for the government to levy carbon taxes on manufacturers with high carbon emissions.When the value of the optimal carbon tax rate is difficult to calculate, the intuitive tax rate can be regarded as a sub-optimal choice when the government formulates the carbon tax rate, and the more competitive the retail market, the closer the intuitive tax rate is to the optimal tax rate.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71471178);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71431006);国家自然科学基金重大国际合作项目(71210003)~~
【分类号】：F224.32;F274

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