国企党组织、治理环境与高管腐败
本文选题:党组织 + 高管腐败 ; 参考:《安徽工业大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:自十八大召开以来,党和国家反腐力度不断加强,越来越多的腐败事件被公布,企业层面的高管腐败现象越来越受到重视。企业高管腐败的出现会损害企业和投资者的利益,阻碍企业的发展,特别是国企高管腐败的频繁发生,对国有资产的保护和增值提出了挑战。因此,如何有效抑制高管腐败行为对企业的健康发展以及社会资源的充分利用具有重要的意义。当前我国正处于经济转型期,国有企业在深化改革的过程中逐渐建立和完善现代企业制度的同时,党委会等企业党组织在公司治理中的地位也得到了巩固和强化。国企党组织作为国有企业内部治理结构中的重要组成部分,在缓解内部人控制矛盾,降低代理成本等方面发挥着重要的作用。关于国企党组织参与公司治理与高管腐败之间的关系,当前鲜有文献对其进行理论分析和实证研究。基于上述考虑,本文采用理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法,首先探讨了国企党组织参与公司治理对国有企业高管腐败行为产生的影响。其次,本文揭示了国企党组织在不同治理参与路径下,其对企业高管腐败行为产生怎样的影响。最后,本文进一步考虑治理环境因素的影响,从企业控制权层级和地区市场化程度两个角度出发,探究了企业在不同治理环境下,国企党组织参与公司治理对高管腐败的抑制作用会发生怎样的变化。本文针对国有企业频繁出现的高管腐败现象,以2009-2014年在媒体和年报上公开报道出现高管腐败行为的A股国有上市公司为研究对象,从公司治理机制的视角出发,考察我国国企党组织参与公司治理和高管腐败之间存在的关系。研究发现:(1)我国国企党组织参与公司治理对企业高管腐败行为具有显著的抑制作用,并且相较于其他治理参与路径,国企党组织通过董事会参与公司治理对高管腐败的抑制作用更加显著;(2)不同政府控制层级的国有企业,企业内部的党组织对高管腐败的抑制作用会有显著差异,相较于地方国有企业,中央国有企业党组织参与公司治理对高管腐败的抑制作用更为显著;(3)国企党组织的治理参与对企业高管腐败的抑制作用会受到地区市场化程度因素的影响,相较于市场化程度高的地区,市场化程度低地区的国企党组织参与公司治理对高管腐败的抑制作用更为显著。
[Abstract]:Since the 18th National Congress, the anti-corruption efforts of the Party and the state have been strengthened, more and more corruption incidents have been announced, and the corruption of executives at the enterprise level has been paid more and more attention.The appearance of executive corruption will harm the interests of enterprises and investors, hinder the development of enterprises, especially the frequent occurrence of senior executives corruption in state-owned enterprises, which challenges the protection and appreciation of state-owned assets.Therefore, how to effectively restrain the corrupt behavior of executives is of great significance to the healthy development of enterprises and the full utilization of social resources.At present, our country is in the economic transition period, while the state-owned enterprises gradually establish and perfect the modern enterprise system in the process of deepening the reform, the position of the party committee and other enterprise party organizations in the corporate governance has also been consolidated and strengthened.As an important part of the internal governance structure of state-owned enterprises, the Party organization of state-owned enterprises plays an important role in alleviating the contradictions of internal control and reducing agency costs.There are few theoretical analysis and empirical research on the relationship between the participation of state-owned party organizations in corporate governance and executive corruption.Based on the above considerations, this paper uses the method of theoretical analysis and empirical test to explore the influence of the participation of state-owned party organizations in corporate governance on the corrupt behavior of senior executives of state-owned enterprises.Secondly, this paper reveals how the party organizations of state-owned enterprises influence the corrupt behavior of enterprise executives under different ways of governance and participation.Finally, this paper further considers the influence of the environmental factors of governance, starting from the level of enterprise control and the degree of regional marketization, probes into the enterprise in different governance environment.How does the party organization of state-owned enterprises participate in corporate governance to restrain executive corruption?In view of the frequent phenomenon of executive corruption in state-owned enterprises, this paper focuses on the listed A-share companies which publicly reported the corruption of senior executives in the media and the annual newspapers in 2009-2014, starting from the perspective of corporate governance mechanism.This paper examines the relationship between the participation of SOE party organizations in corporate governance and executive corruption.The study found that the participation of state-owned party organizations in corporate governance has a significant inhibitory effect on corporate executives' corrupt behavior, and compared with other paths of governance participation,Party organizations in state-owned enterprises participate in corporate governance through the board of directors to inhibit the corruption of senior executives more significantly. (2) in state-owned enterprises with different levels of government control, there will be significant differences in the inhibitory effects of party organizations within enterprises on the corruption of senior executives.Compared with local state-owned enterprises,The inhibition effect of the participation of the central state-owned enterprise party organization on the executive corruption is more significant than that of the central state-owned enterprise party organization's participation in corporate governance. (3) the inhibition effect of the state-owned party organization's governance participation on the enterprise senior management corruption will be affected by the regional marketization factor.Compared with the regions with high degree of marketization, the party organizations of state-owned enterprises in the low degree of marketization play a more significant role in restraining the corruption of senior executives.
【学位授予单位】:安徽工业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D267;F276.1
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 刘丁荧;;对国企高管腐败行为的约束分析——基于党组织治理与国家审计视角[J];商业会计;2016年15期
2 胡振兴;;上市公司高管腐败对经营业绩的危害及鉴证研究[J];财经理论与实践;2016年04期
3 张玮倩;方军雄;;地区腐败、企业性质与高管腐败[J];会计与经济研究;2016年03期
4 曹伟;杨德明;赵璨;;政治晋升预期与高管腐败——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J];经济学动态;2016年02期
5 杨德明;赵璨;;内部控制、媒体曝光率与国有企业高管腐败[J];财务研究;2015年05期
6 卢馨;吴婷;龙丹;;国企高管腐败:激励失效还是约束缺失?——基于“古井腐败窝案”的分析[J];中国人力资源开发;2015年12期
7 胡明霞;干胜道;;管理层权力、内部控制与高管腐败[J];中南财经政法大学学报;2015年03期
8 赵璨;杨德明;曹伟;;行政权、控制权与国有企业高管腐败[J];财经研究;2015年05期
9 卢馨;方睿孜;郑阳飞;;外部治理环境能够抑制企业高管腐败吗?[J];经济与管理研究;2015年03期
10 陈仕华;姜广省;李维安;王春林;;国有企业纪委的治理参与能否抑制高管私有收益?[J];经济研究;2014年10期
相关重要报纸文章 前1条
1 蓝定香;;混合所有制:地方国企与央企的改革异同[N];四川日报;2014年
相关博士学位论文 前1条
1 王元芳;中国国有企业党组织参与公司治理有效性研究[D];南开大学;2013年
相关硕士学位论文 前1条
1 郑阳飞;公司外部治理约束对高管腐败的影响研究[D];暨南大学;2014年
,本文编号:1759338
本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/xmjj/1759338.html