管理层持股、所有权性质与公司诉讼风险

发布时间：2018-04-21 13:13

本文选题：管理层持股 + 所有权性质　；参考：《软科学》2017年05期

【摘要】：基于公司治理理论,以20072014年中国非金融类上市公司为样本,从理论与实证角度分析了管理层持股对公司诉讼风险的影响。研究结果表明:(1)管理层持股比例越高,公司涉诉的可能性越低,涉诉的频度和严重性越低;(2)所有权性质对管理层持股与公司诉讼风险的关系起到调节作用,相对国有控股上市公司而言,民营控股上市公司管理层持股比例越高,公司诉讼风险越低。研究结论在我国上市公司推进股权激励计划的背景下有现实意义,为民营企业实施管理层股权激励机制,促进管理层与股东利益趋于一致,降低公司诉讼风险提供了经验证据。
[Abstract]:Based on the theory of corporate governance, this paper analyzes the influence of managerial shareholding on corporate litigation risk from the perspective of theory and demonstration, taking China's non-financial listed companies as a sample in 2007 and 2014. The results show that the higher the proportion of managerial ownership, the lower the possibility of litigation, and the lower the frequency and severity of litigation.) the nature of ownership has a moderating effect on the relationship between managerial shareholding and corporate litigation risk. Compared with the state-owned listed companies, the higher the proportion of management ownership, the lower the litigation risk. The conclusion is of practical significance under the background of promoting the equity incentive plan of listed companies in our country. It provides empirical evidence for private enterprises to implement management equity incentive mechanism, promote the interests of management and shareholders tend to converge, and reduce the risk of corporate litigation.
【作者单位】：南昌航空大学数学与信息科学院;江西财经大学现代经济管理学院;上海财经大学国际工商管理学院;
【基金】：上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2015-326)
【分类号】：F271

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