国有企业集团公司治理与代理成本——来自国有上市公司的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-22 15:27

本文选题：集团治理 + 国有企业　；参考：《经济管理》2016年08期

【摘要】：本文研究了在国有企业改组为国有企业集团的情况下,如何进一步发挥集团治理优势,改善国有企业突出的管理层代理问题。基于国有企业集团上市成员企业数据,本文分析了组织层面、业务层面和人员层面的集团治理策略在抑制国有企业管理层代理问题的效果。结果发现,国有企业集团可以通过减少管理层级、提高成员企业与集团业务紧密度、增加拥有商务背景的集团兼任人员三项集团治理策略,加强对成员企业管理层的治理,降低成员企业管理层的代理成本。本研究表明,合理设计集团治理策略可以进一步提高国有企业集团治理效果;提高国有企业管理层代理问题的治理效果除了要治理"信息不对称",更重要的是治理"知识不对称"。
[Abstract]:This paper studies how to further exert the advantages of group governance and improve the outstanding management agency problem of state-owned enterprises under the condition that state-owned enterprises are restructured into state-owned enterprise groups. Based on the data of listed members of state-owned enterprise groups, this paper analyzes the effects of group governance strategies at organizational level, business level and personnel level on restraining the problem of management agency in state-owned enterprises. The results show that the state-owned enterprise group can strengthen the management of the member enterprise by reducing the management level, enhancing the tightness between the member enterprise and the group business, increasing the three group governance strategies of the group with business background, and strengthening the management of the member enterprise. Reduce the agency cost of the management of the member enterprise. This study shows that reasonable design of group governance strategy can further improve the effectiveness of state-owned enterprise group governance; In order to improve the governance effect of the management agency problem in state-owned enterprises, it is more important not only to deal with "information asymmetry", but also to deal with "knowledge asymmetry".
【作者单位】：北京工业大学经济与管理学院;北京大学光华管理学院;
【分类号】：F275;F276.1

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